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Corporate Social Responsibility  
in a Remedy-Seeking Society:  
A Public Choice Perspective 
Donald J. Kochan* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article applies the lessons of public choice theory to examine 
corporate social responsibility. The Article adopts a broad definition of corporate 
social responsibility activism to include both (1) those efforts that seek to 
convince corporations to voluntarily take into account corporate social 
responsibility in their own decision-making, and (2) the efforts to alter the legal 
landscape and expand legal obligations of corporations beyond traditional 
notions of harm and duty so as to force corporations to invest in interests other 
than shareholders and profits because they must comply with these new laws. 
After surveying the corporate social responsibility debate, this Article 
examines public interest-labeled groups (including corporate social 
responsibility groups) under a public choice lens and determines that they seek 
to maximize their budgets, maximize influence, maximize membership, secure 
their jobs, and in the case of corporate social responsibility sometimes directly 
effectuate wealth transfers into their organizations or constituencies (e.g., from 
shareholders to stakeholders). When rent-seeking for legal change is the more 
efficient use of corporate social responsibility advocates’ limited resources, those 
groups will invest in the creation of law. 
This Article pays special attention to a broad definition of rent-seeking 
that includes the investments made, through precedent-building litigation 
models, in the creation of legal liability regimes or realistic new threats of legal 
liability in an effort to obtain leverage over corporations in settlements or other 
negotiations designed to convince corporations to change behavior. According to 
studies on settlement dynamics, when novel new litigation theories start to 
survive motions to dismiss, corporate defendants have more incentives to settle 
to avoid harm to reputation or brand, in addition to avoiding adverse 
judgments. The Article concludes using the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) as a case 
study illustrating how the interest-group dynamic can play out in the 
development of a corporate social responsibility-driven liability regime. 
 
* Professor of Law, Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law. I am 
grateful for valuable research assistance from William Kelly, comments from Dean Tom 
Campbell, and the comments and support of Jennifer Spinella. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Advocates for some corporate “socially responsible” role and 
the imposition of some duties upon corporate boards greater than 
maximizing wealth often cast themselves as society’s champions 
for the greater public interest or public good. This is too simple a 
story. A primary goal of this Article will be to demonstrate that 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) advocates are interest 
groups too. Thus, law and economics can teach us a bit about the 
behaviors we can expect from corporate social responsibility 
advocates, depending on the available legal architecture which 
can be deployed to advance the advocates’ interests and 
preferences in an effort to gain leverage against their 
adversaries—the profit-seeking corporations. Corporate social 
responsibility advocates will engage in rent-seeking behavior, 
investing in legal outcomes when it is beneficial to their cause. 
Thus, how the law of corporate social responsibility is shaped and 
how advocates operate to shape the law can each be explained in 
part by reference to interest-group behaviors and public choice 
theory. While corporate social responsibility reverberates with 
sounds of the wonderful, it has rent-seeking undertones like any 
other effort to use the law to shape social policy through controls 
on private behavior. 
After centuries of academics weighing in on the debate over 
corporate social responsibility, there exists almost a required 
four-part checklist of introductory disclaimers in any article that 
will soon ink yet more pages on the already swollen corporate 
social responsibility bookshelf. There are, at least, some 
predictable, seemingly obligatory categories of observation in 
most article introductions and I will provide my due compliance 
before proceeding. 
First, an author should acknowledge that they are 
cautiously, indeed nervously and with some hesitation, entering 
a field already well tread. Professor Cynthia Williams, for 
example, in one of her lengthy explorations of corporate social 
responsibility stated that “[i]t is with some trepidation that this 
author undertakes a rather extended venture into the contested 
arena of corporate social responsibility.”1 I hereby incorporate 
that statement and thereby check off the first box on the list. 
Second, the author should alert readers that the academic 
material on corporate social responsibility is massive and 
overwhelming and acknowledge that it is hard to imagine why 
 
 1 Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic 
Globalization, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 705, 706 (2002). 
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someone would want to read yet another article in this seemingly 
saturated area of law, economics, and public policy. Professors 
Henry Butler and Fred McChesney captured this sentiment well 
when they exclaimed while writing on corporate social 
responsibility that “[f]or centuries legal, political, social, and 
economic commentators have debated corporate social 
responsibility ad nauseam.”2 
Third, it is obligatory to mention something about the 
definition of corporate social responsibility. Quite frequently this 
will involve some explanation that there is no one, definitive 
definition of corporate social responsibility, and this cautionary 
note will sometimes include a statement that the author will not 
attempt a singular definition. Usually it will also follow with 
some statement that the author will focus on one or more 
particular meanings of the phrase captured within the broader 
concept of corporate social responsibility. Consider Professor 
Peter Madsen’s comment in the opening to an article that 
“[d]efining CSR is, as the saying goes, like trying to nail Jell-O to 
the wall.”3 Or, as Williams explains as another example, “[o]ver 
the past decades . . . it has been difficult to define what one 
means, in any fully specified way, by the concept of corporate 
social responsibility, and thus it has been difficult to discuss 
except at a high level of generality.”4 There is no doubt that 
corporate social responsibility is tough to define and means 
different things to different people. As this Article proceeds, I will 
attempt to make clear the meaning of the phrase as I intend to 
use it when possible or helpful, but I will also write with some of 
the necessary generalities.5 
In this Article, I will be defining corporate social 
responsibility activism broadly as related to both (1) those efforts 
that seek to convince corporations to voluntarily take into 
account corporate social responsibility in their own 
decision-making, willingly launch corporate initiatives based on 
concerns beyond profit, and sometimes specifically and 
intentionally address social and stakeholder values; and (2) the 
efforts to alter the legal landscape and expand legal obligations of 
corporations beyond traditional notions of harm and duty so as to 
 
 2 Henry N. Butler & Fred S. McChesney, Why They Give at the Office: Shareholder 
Welfare and Corporate Philanthropy in the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 84 
CORNELL L. REV. 1195, 1195 (1999). 
 3 Peter Madsen, Professionals, Business Practitioners, and Prudential Justice, 39 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 835, 836 (2008). 
 4 Williams, supra note 1, at 775. 
 5 David Millon, Shareholder Social Responsibility, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 911, 919 
(2013) (“There is no single, generally accepted definition of CSR,” but “it is possible to 
sketch the concept’s meaning in broad outlines.”). 
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force corporations to invest in interests other than shareholders 
and profits because it must comply with these new laws. 
Throughout this Article, I will also use terms like activism, 
advocacy, and expansionism interchangeably to capture the 
nature of those interest groups that seek to engraft new social 
welfare-oriented obligations, and impose higher standards, on 
corporations. These interest groups see businesses as their 
opposition or competition. 
Finally, within the four obligatory components of a corporate 
social responsibility article introduction, the author should make 
some claim that there is something new and unique in the article 
at hand that makes it worthy of some attention. This is 
particularly important because the corporate social responsibility 
field is already so substantially plowed. Sometimes, the claim 
will be about something truly new. At other times, the author 
might need to admit that the work is partly new just in the sense 
that this particular author has never said it before and not yet 
thrown his perspective into the mix. Professor Stephen 
Bainbridge provided an insight on this phenomena when he 
observed in an article focused on corporate social responsibility 
that, usually, every current corporate social responsibility 
“debate is not being driven by any crisis in corporate law,”6 but 
instead “[i]t is just a perennial problem on which each new 
generation of corporate law scholars feels obliged to put its 
stamp.”7 
While there will be a bit of that “first time in print by my 
pen” newness in this article and some articulations will be made 
for the first time by this author, yet not the first time such ideas 
have ever been uttered, my aim is to provide a few insights that 
have not yet been articulated in the literature with any sense of 
clarity. Principal among these will be why it is useful to look at 
corporate social responsibility advocates as classic interest 
groups seeking to obtain wealth transfers that they would be 
incapable of receiving absent their manipulation of the legal 
process to achieve changes in legal doctrine in order to obtain 
advantage in advancing their goals. In particular, this Article 
will focus on the investments corporate social responsibility 
advocates make in the creation of legal liability regimes or 
realistic new threats of legal liability in an effort to obtain 
 
 6 Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: 
A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1435 n.40 (1993) [hereinafter 
Bainbridge, In Defense]. 
 7 Id. Bainbridge followed this claim directly with the statement, “[h]erewith my 
spin.” Id. 
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leverage over corporations in settlements or other negotiations 
designed to convince corporations to change behavior. 
Part I will survey the corporate social responsibility debate, 
briefly describing the spectrum along which the arguments 
regarding wealth-maximization and other more expansive social 
responsibilities exist. Part I will conclude with an introduction to 
the means by which law can provide benefits to those seeking 
acceptance for greater, more expansive notions of corporate social 
responsibility. Part II will introduce public choice and 
interest-group theory. It will explain the process of rent-seeking 
for legal advantage and explain why corporate social 
responsibility activists should be received with the skepticism 
afforded all interest groups in the political process. It will 
conclude that, like other interest groups, corporate social 
responsibility activists try to use the law to obtain advantages for 
their cause at a lower cost than they could obtain these benefits 
by bargaining for these things in the open marketplace. The law 
and economics literature does not discuss often enough the 
separate public choice and rent-seeking phenomena distinctively 
seen in the development of liabilities through litigation.8 Part II 
will also discuss this process of rent-seeking as being broader 
than the pursuit of legislation. Any concept of rent-seeking 
should include interest group investment in changing the law to 
create liability regimes that benefit the group (here, corporate 
social responsibility advocates) and expand the duties and 
compensatory obligations of their competitors (here, 
corporations).   
Despite the fact that the literature is saturated with articles 
on almost every aspect of corporate social responsibility, there is 
surprisingly little attention paid to the interest group dynamics 
in the contest between corporations and advocates for a more 
expansive type of corporate social responsibility above and 
beyond what might occur as a natural consequence of seeking 
wealth-maximization. Although there are a number of examples 
of rent-seeking behaviors by corporate social responsibility 
advocates that could be discussed, given the limited space for this 
symposium article, Part III will examine only one type of 
behavior with one case study—liability-seeking efforts under the 
Alien Tort Statute (ATS).9 The ATS provides a recent example 
where we saw the interest-group dynamic play out in the 
 
 8 Paul H. Rubin, Christopher Curran & John F. Curran, Litigation Versus 
Legislation: Forum Shopping by Rent Seekers, 107 PUB. CHOICE 295, 295–96 (2001) 
(discussing the relatively fewer works devoted to public choice implications in litigation 
for rent-seeking ends vis-à-vis the number of similar analyses of legislative processes). 
 9 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). 
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development of a liability regime for human rights and other 
international law abuses. Part III examines the evolution of the 
ATS as a liability-imposing corporate social responsibility tool. 
The corporate social responsibility advocates’ investment in the 
development of an ATS liability doctrine (for a time with some 
substantial success) will demonstrate how interest groups 
operate in what might be called “rent-seeking” through judicially 
based “remedy-seeking” behavior. 
In the end, through general analysis and the ATS case study, 
this Article seeks to unveil the public interest curtain that often 
shields corporate social responsibility activists from the scrutiny 
their efforts should receive. When it comes to corporations, a 
remedy-seeking society is often too quick to presume that more 
socially desirable outcomes require restraining corporate 
shareholder wealth. At the very least, it should be understood 
that any efforts to do so will advantage another self-interested 
group rather than somehow serving primarily the true public 
interest. 
I. THE CONTOURS OF THE CORPORATE SOCIAL  
RESPONSIBILITY DEBATE 
A.  A Ubiquitous Contest Between Two Competing Visions of 
Responsibility and Duty 
Corporate social responsibility has no single, accepted 
definition, yet it stirs the passions of many behind their own 
conception of the term.10 As a result, issues regarding the social 
responsibility of corporations—including whether there are any 
such obligations at all—have generated substantial debate over 
the years.11 
Within the debate over the scope of corporate social 
responsibility there are two poles with varying positions in 
between.12 On one side of the spectrum are those who believe 
that corporations have social responsibilities of some kind or 
degree beyond the bottom line and beyond compliance with 
existing laws. The opposite side of the spectrum believes that the 
social responsibility of corporations cannot be judged outside of 
the obligation of a corporation to achieve wealth-maximization in 
the corporate management’s fiduciary duties to its shareholders 
 
 10 Williams, supra note 1, at 775. 
 11 Millon, supra note 5, at 921 (“Given the lack of an agreed definition of CSR, it 
comes as no surprise that there are several different models or theories of CSR.”). 
 12 Williams, supra note 1, at 711–20 (summarizing the corporate social responsibility 
literature and the varying legal and policy positions). 
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or obligations in compliance with its web of contracts. Of course, 
nuanced definitional issues and middle ground positions appear 
within the discussion as well—including questions regarding 
what counts as “law,” what is our definition of “duty” and “harm,” 
and what is the meaning of “wealth-” or “profit-maximization.” 
This section will briefly discuss the presence and growth of the 
debate within corporate law followed by a brief discussion of the 
substantive claims behind the wealth-maximization theories 
juxtaposed with the more expansive theories of corporate social 
responsibility. 
While it is true that this is an age-old debate,13 there is no 
doubt that the issue of corporate social responsibility—especially 
the rise of camps arguing for an enlarged sense of corporate duty 
to social interests and stakeholders outside of the corporate 
form—has received steadily increasing attention across the past 
several decades. One insight into this evolution of the corporate 
social responsibility conversation can be gleaned from a survey of 
the use of the phrase “corporate social responsibility” across time. 
For that task, I will turn briefly to the results from Google ’s 
Ngram function14—which has been described as “the first tool of 
its kind, capable of precisely and rapidly quantifying cultural 
trends based on massive quantities of data. It is a gateway to 
culturomics!”15 This unique Google product enables users “to 
examine the frequency of words . . . or phrases . . . in books over 
time.”16 The database permits searching “through over 5.2 
million books: ~4% of all books ever published!”17 The creators 
proclaim that this tool will have “profound consequences for the 
study of language, lexicography, and grammar.”18 The Ngram 
 
 13 Butler & McChesney, supra note 2, at 1195. 
 14 GOOGLE BOOKS NGRAM VIEWER, http://books.google.com/ngrams (last visited Oct. 
4, 2013) [hereinafter Google Labs Ngram Viewer] (based on the model and database 
developed by Jean-Baptiste Michel, Yuan Kui Shen, Aviva Presser Aiden, Adrian Veres, 
Matthew K. Gray, William Brockman, The Google Books Team, Joseph P. Pickett, Dale 
Hoiberg, Dan Clancy, Peter Norvig, Jon Orwant, Steven Pinker, Martin A. Nowak, and 
Erez Lieberman Aiden. See Jean-Baptiste Michel, Yuan Kui Shen, Aviva Presser Aiden, 
Adrian Veres, Matthew K. Gray, William Brockman, The Google Books Team, Joseph P. 
Pickett, Dale Hoiberg, Dan Clancy, Peter Norvig, Jon Orwant, Steven Pinker, Martin A. 
Nowak, & Erez Lieberman Aiden, Quantitative Analysis of Culture Using Millions of 
Digitized Books, SCIENCE, Jan. 14, 2011, at 176, available at http://www.sciencemag.org/ 
content/early/2010/12/15/science.1199644). 
 15 Google Ngram Viewer, CULTUROMICS, http://www.culturomics.org/Resources/A-
users-guide-to-culturomics (last visited Oct. 3, 2013); see also Michel et al., supra note 14, 
at 176 (describing the database and related data collection tool). 
 16 Google Ngram Viewer, supra note 15. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Michel et al., supra note 14, at 178, Figure 2; see also id. at 177 (“Our results 
suggest that culturomic tools will aid lexicographers in at least two ways: (i) finding 
low-frequency words that they do not list, and (ii) providing accurate estimates of current 
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Viewer undoubtedly provides an interesting picture for 
discussion of the usage of words and phrases, although it 
admittedly has some inherent limitations and some recognized 
criticisms of its scientific value.19 
The Ngram for the phrase “corporate social responsibility” 
shows the phrase’s increased usage over time, and an especially 
interesting rate of increase since 2000, likely as a result of our 
increased scrutiny of corporations following a series of financial 
crises: 
TABLE 1: 
GOOGLE LABS BOOKS NGRAM VIEWER 
GRAPH CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FROM 1900 TO 2008  
FROM THE CORPUS OF ENGLISH WITH A SMOOTHING OF 3 
 
 
Source: GOOGLE BOOKS NGRAM VIEWER, http://books.google.com/ngrams (last visited Oct. 4, 
2013) (based on the model and database developed by Jean-Baptiste Michel, Yuan Kui 
Shen, Aviva Presser Aiden, Adrian Veres, Matthew K. Gray, William Brockman, The 
Google Books Team, Joseph P. Pickett, Dale Hoiberg, Dan Clancy, Peter Norvig, Jon 
Orwant, Steven Pinker, Martin A. Nowak, and Erez Lieberman Aiden, Quantitative 
Analysis of Culture Using Millions of Digitized Books, SCIENCE, Jan. 14, 2011, at 176). 
Table 1 shows trends from 1900 to 2008 (the latest available 
date) for the unigram “corporate social responsibility.” The y-axis 
shows what percentage of all the unigrams contained in Google’s 
sample of books written in English include the phrase “corporate 
social responsibility.” “Usage frequency is computed by dividing 
the number of instances of the n-gram in a given year by the 
 
frequency trends to reduce the lag between changes in the lexicon and changes in the 
dictionary.”). 
 19 John Bohannon, Google Opens Books to New Cultural Studies, 330 SCIENCE 1600, 
1600 (2010) (describing the Ngram project and its initial critics). Peer review is as of yet 
limited on this relatively new tool, yet even the creators warn, “[b]asically, if you’re going 
to use this corpus for scientific purposes, you’ll need to do careful controls to make sure it 
can support your application. Like with any other piece of evidence about the human past, 
the challenge with culturomic trajectories lie in their interpretation.” Google Ngram 
Viewer, supra note 15. Suggestions for controls are available in the main paper 
supporting the application. See also Michel et al., supra note 14, at 181. “Culturomic 
results are a new type of evidence in the humanities. As with fossils of ancient creatures, 
the challenge of culturomics lies in the interpretation of this evidence.” Id. (giving a few 
example searches with interpretations). 
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total number of words in the corpus in that year.”20 Smoothing 
allows for a consideration of the trends as a moving average and 
can be adjusted for any search.21 When one runs the search on 
Google, hyperlinks appear underneath the graph, allowing one to 
browse through the books available that contributed to the data 
set.22 
Although the Ngram reveals “corporate social responsibility” 
appears in an extremely small percentage of the overall books in 
Google’s digitized collection, it certainly shows both a notable 
frequency and a significant upward trend in its usage. This is, 
admittedly, only a collection of raw data. But the usage and trend 
are both apparent. 
With an increased discussion of expanded corporate social 
responsibilities, the academic, legal, and policy discussions have 
also increasingly debated both the existence and meaning of 
“stakeholders”—some constituency, larger than the shareholders 
of corporations and those with whom the corporation holds 
contracts, to which the corporation nonetheless owes some duty 
on which to expend corporate resources. As Williams explains, 
“the current corporate social responsibility debate often involves 
a competition between shareholder versus stakeholder 
conceptions of the corporation.”23 
According to Professor David Millon, for example, “the 
pragmatic definition [of ‘stakeholder’] advanced by business 
ethics expert R. Edward Freeman has intuitive appeal, is 
reasonably workable, and has proved to be durable: a stakeholder 
of a particular corporation is anyone who ‘can affect or is affected 
by the achievement of an organization’s objectives.’”24 Millon 
 
 20 Michel et al., supra note 14, at 176. The Google Ngram data is “normalize[d] by 
the number of books published in each year.” What Does the Ngram Viewer Do?, GOOGLE 
BOOKS, http://books.google.com/ngrams/info (last visited Oct. 4, 2013). 
 21 Google Books describes “smoothing” as follows: 
Often trends become more apparent when data is viewed as a moving average. 
A smoothing of 1 means that the data shown for 1950 will be an average of the 
raw count for 1950 plus 1 value on either side: (“count for 1949” + “count for 
1950” + “count for 1951”), divided by 3. So a smoothing of 10 means that 21 
values will be averaged: 10 on either side, plus the target value in the center of 
them. At the left and right edges of the graph, fewer values are averaged. With 
a smoothing of 3, the leftmost value (pretend it’s the year 1950) will be 
calculated as (“count for 1950” + “count for 1951” + “count for 1952” + “count 
for 1953”), divided by 4. 
What Does the Ngram Viewer Do?, supra note 20. 
 22 Id. (“Below the graph, we show ‘interesting’ year ranges for your query terms. 
Clicking on those will submit your query directly to Google Books.”).  
 23 Williams, supra note 1, at 707. 
 24 Millon, supra note 5, at 920 (quoting R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC 
MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH 46 (1984)). 
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adequately explains these persons affected (and thereby defined 
as “stakeholders”) as including “workers, creditors, local 
communities, suppliers, consumers, and those affected by the 
corporation’s impact on the environment.”25 Freeman and 
Millon’s definition captures the essence of what most people 
mean by the term. But the “anyone who can affect or is affected 
by” language should be sufficient for the reader to understand 
the potentially unlimited breadth of possible stakeholder 
constituencies. 
Tracking the rise of the usage of the word “stakeholder” over 
time is another interesting way to illustrate the injection of 
corporate social responsibility into our vocabulary and usage. The 
Ngram tool allows the researcher to compare two terms or 
phrases, thus Table 2 provides the Ngrams for both “shareholder” 
and “stakeholder.” 
TABLE 2: 
GOOGLE LABS BOOKS NGRAM VIEWER 
GRAPH SHAREHOLDER (UPPER LINE) V. STAKEHOLDER (LOWER LINE)  
FROM 1800 TO 2008 FROM THE CORPUS OF ENGLISH WITH A SMOOTHING OF 3 
 
 
Source: GOOGLE BOOKS NGRAM VIEWER, http://books.google.com/ngrams (last visited Oct. 4, 
2013) (based on the model and database developed by Jean-Baptiste Michel, Yuan Kui 
Shen, Aviva Presser Aiden, Adrian Veres, Matthew K. Gray, William Brockman, The 
Google Books Team, Joseph P. Pickett, Dale Hoiberg, Dan Clancy, Peter Norvig, Jon 
Orwant, Steven Pinker, Martin A. Nowak, and Erez Lieberman Aiden, Quantitative 
Analysis of Culture Using Millions of Digitized Books, SCIENCE, Jan. 14, 2011, at 176). 
Table 2 shows trends from 1800 to 2008 (the latest available 
date) for the unigrams “stockholder” as the upper line and 
“stakeholder” as the lower line. As Table 2 shows, the usage of 
“shareholder” has seen a rather steady increase from the 
mid-1800s to the mid-1970s, with a heightened rate of increase in 
frequency of usage since the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
“Stakeholder” barely registers on the graph before the late 1970s 
and has since shown a steadily sharp rise across the past three 
decades. This data regarding the use of the term in books stands 
 
 25 Id. 
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as a possible proxy for its overall importance in the corporate law 
discussion. The rise in usage illustrated here coincides with an 
increasing importance given to the stakeholder concept in 
corporate law discussions. 
It is clear that corporate social responsibility is a 
continuingly important part of the current corporate law 
discourse. As noted at the outset of this Part, there are two 
extremes involved in this debate that see the duty of a 
corporation quite differently. For those with a 
wealth-maximization view, corporate social responsibility has 
little meaning beyond maximizing the wealth of the shareholders 
and complying with contracts and the law.26 Any benefits to the 
rest of society are happy benefits of the corporation’s focus on 
profits.27 Occupying the other pole in the spectrum, another view 
might be described as the progressive or expansive side, oriented 
toward advocating for broad-based duties for the corporation—
both morally and legally. For this side, there is a greater 
constituency other than shareholders (even including at times all 
of “society”) with whom profits must be shared, for the protection 
of whom profits may need to be sacrificed, or for the benefit of 
whom expenditures must be made.28 
I have described the conflict in previous work as requiring us 
to decide what guidance we suggest and what requirements we 
impose (as a matter of law or policy) to define “proper” corporate 
decision-making: 
  The spectrum between these extremes resembles the classic 
debate over the negative and positive rights of man as they relate to 
obligation and the justification for intervention by institutions of 
power. The corporate social responsibility discussion raises three 
principal issues about how a moral corporation lives its life: how a 
corporation chooses its self-interest versus the interests of others, 
when and how it should help others if control decisions may harm the 
shareholder owners, and how far the corporation must affirmatively 
 
 26 See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962); see also Milton 
Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is To Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES 
MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32. 
 27 Elsewhere I have described this side of the spectrum as viewing “the concept of 
corporate social responsibility as essentially nonexistent, unless it happens to be an 
accidental and spontaneous outcome of otherwise self-interested financial motives of a 
profit-maximizing corporation.” Donald J. Kochan, Legal Mechanization of Corporate 
Social Responsibility Through Alien Tort Statute Litigation: A Response to Professor 
Branson with Some Supplemental Thoughts, 9 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 251, 254 (2011) 
[hereinafter Kochan, Mechanization]. 
 28 In previous work, I have described this extreme as one that advances the notion 
that “corporations should become governmental surrogates, conscripted philanthropists, 
or otherwise constrained with affirmative perceived-moral obligations that can be 
compelled by coercive force.” Id. 
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go to help right the perceived wrongs in the world in which it 
operates.29 
These issues go to the heart of the debate about the meaning 
of corporate social responsibility. The remaining sections in this 
Part will further examine in more detail the sides of the 
spectrum in this corporate social responsibility debate and will 
take a look at each side’s expectations for the law’s role in 
protecting or advancing its positions. 
B.  The Shareholder Wealth- or Profit-Maximization Camp 
Regardless of whether one adopts a separation of ownership 
and control conception of the corporation or a nexus of contracts 
conception, both accept a wealth-maximization model of 
corporate social responsibility (even if for slightly different 
reasons).30 The primary constraint on corporate behavior is not 
the advancement of some vague social interest but instead is the 
advancement of profits within the bounds of the law, which 
includes compliance with contracts and compliance with 
otherwise generally applicable legal rules and regulations.31 
Despite extensive efforts to dislodge it, this traditional view also 
remains the predominantly accepted legal view of a corporation’s 
social responsibility.32 
Proponents of the wealth-maximization view claim that 
these more certain and limited metrics are not only substantively 
superior, but they are also better defined—making them more 
manageable and more susceptible to monitoring. As Clark 
explains, “[a] single, objective goal like profit-maximization is 
 
 29 Id. (citing CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 1 (1978) (writing generally on the 
obligations of man and his relation to the state using an analogous set of choices)). 
 30 See Bainbridge, In Defense, supra note 6, at 1427–28 (some reach a preference for 
the wealth-maximization norm but as a result of a nexus of contracts theory of corporate 
law rather than focusing on the separation of ownership and control). 
 31 Clark explains the idea that profit is conditioned upon compliance with applicable 
law as follows: 
[T]he profit-maximizing norm does not imply that corporations and their 
managers have only minimal legal obligations to persons other than 
shareholders. Quite the contrary is true. Every major relationship between the 
corporation and persons or groups it affects is subject to vast and intricate 
bodies of legal doctrine and to legal enforcement mechanisms. These legal 
controls are ineffective in some instances and suboptimal in others, but they 
exist. 
ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 16.2 (1986). 
 32 See Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial 
Organization, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063, 2065 (2001) (“Shareholder wealth maximization is 
usually accepted as the appropriate goal in American business circles.”); Williams, supra 
note 1, at 714 (describing profit-maximization and that the “predominant academic view 
in the United States about corporate social responsibility is directly derived from the 
shareholder theory of the corporation”). 
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more easily monitored than a multiple, vaguely defined goal like 
fair and reasonable accommodation of all affected interests.”33 
The work of Milton Friedman is often associated as the 
standard bearer for this “wealth-maximizing” or 
“profit-maximizing” view of corporate social responsibility.34 As 
Friedman states: 
  The view . . . that corporate officials and labor leaders have a 
‘social responsibility’ that goes beyond serving the interest of their 
stockholders or their members . . . shows a fundamental 
misconception of the character and nature of a free economy. In such 
an economy, there is one and only one social responsibility of 
business—to use its resources and engage in activities designed to 
increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, 
which is to say, engages in open and free competition, without 
deception or fraud.35 
This wealth-maximization view also famously finds support 
in the 1919 Michigan Supreme Court decision in Dodge v. Ford 
Motor Company where the court denounced Henry Ford’s plan to 
share profits with employees at the expense of shareholders.36 
There the court explicated clear limits on the discretion of 
corporations to take into account broader social interests in its 
expenditures of profits: 
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the 
profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be 
employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in 
the choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a 
change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the 
nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them 
to other purposes.37 
Dodge remains a dominant force in defining the prevailing 
view of corporate social responsibility within corporate law.38   
This view as expressed by Friedman and in Dodge is largely 
based on the traditional notion of the corporation as involving the 
separation of ownership and control. This position rejects any 
 
 33 CLARK, supra note 31, § 16.2. 
 34 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate 
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 564 (2003) (“Milton Friedman’s famous essay on 
corporate responsibility remains the classic statement of the shareholder primacy 
model.”); see also Roe, supra note 32, at 2065 n.2 (2001) (“Although aggressive when it 
appeared, Friedman’s perspective is now mainstream in American business circles . . . .”). 
 35 FRIEDMAN, supra note 26, at 133; see also Friedman, supra note 26, at 124. 
 36 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919). 
 37 Id. 
 38 See Bainbridge, In Defense, supra note 6, at 1423–24 (“[T]he mainstream of 
corporate law remains committed to the principles espoused by the Dodge court.”).  
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and all duties to those other than the shareholders.39 It contends 
that corporate decisions to spend shareholder profits on societal 
needs or goods imposes a tax on, or constitutes a wealth transfer 
from, those shareholders and that it illegitimately does so 
without shareholder consent.40 Others reach the same conclusion 
regarding wealth-maximization as the optimal restraint on 
corporate decisions, although adopting a nexus of contracts 
conception of the corporation whereby the corporation’s scope of 
duty is itself constrained in a manner that does not directly take 
into account outside stakeholder constituencies.41 
Importantly, as Ribstein notes, “the legal issue is not 
whether the corporation or any of the individuals who manage it 
should care about society.”42 The better question is “whether the 
law should mandate such governance, given lawmakers’ inherent 
limitations, the potential costs of legal rules, and disagreements 
about appropriate social objectives.”43 The wealth-maximization 
view does not mean that corporate managers are heartless or 
that corporations will fail to contribute to social welfare. As 
previously mentioned, the economic growth spurred by 
corporations pursuing profits helps all of society. And specifically, 
those in the wealth-maximization camp point to the jobs created, 
the contracting engaged in that consumes goods and services, the 
goods produced and services provided, and the taxes paid by 
corporations, for example, as evidence that corporations are 
 
 39 As Macey explains: 
Under traditional state and corporate law doctrine, officers and directors of 
both public and closely held firms owe fiduciary duties to shareholders and to 
shareholders alone. Directors and officers are legally required to manage a 
corporation for the exclusive benefit of its shareholders, and protection for 
other sorts of claimants exists only to the extent provided by contract. 
Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making 
Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. 
REV. 23, 23 (1991) [hereinafter Macey, An Economic Analysis]; see also THE AM. LAW 
INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
§ 2.01(a) (1994) (“[A] corporation . . . should have as its objective the conduct of business 
activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain.”).  
 40 Aneel Karnani, The Case Against Corporate Social Responsibility, WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 23, 2010, at R1 (“Managers who sacrifice profit for the common good also are in 
effect imposing a tax on their shareholders and arbitrarily deciding how that money 
should be spent.”). 
 41 Bainbridge, In Defense, supra note 6, at 1429–30 (under the nexus of contracts, 
wealth-maximization and fiduciary duties exclusive to shareholders is set as the efficient 
default rule away from which rational investors will not likely deviate).  
 42 See Larry E. Ribstein, Accountability and Responsibility in Corporate Governance, 
81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1431, 1432 (2006). 
 43 Id. at 1432–33 (emphasis added). 
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helping others when pursuing their own profit-maximizing 
ends.44 
One of the most important constraints on 
wealth-maximization is that a corporation is duty-bound to 
comply with the law. As Clark explains, the view holds that 
“[p]rofits should be made as large as possible, within the [limited 
legitimate] constraints,” which first and foremost includes 
compliance with the law.45 
There is yet another important limitation that deserves 
special mention as well. It is an obvious but too often ignored 
sub-constraint within the wealth-maximization constraint—the 
power of consumer demand and the price system. As Ludwig von 
Mises has explained, corporate power is only as good as the 
orders given by the captains of the market—the consumers: 
  The direction of all economic affairs is in the market society a task 
of the entrepreneurs. Theirs is the control of production. They are at 
the helm and steer the ship. A superficial observer would believe that 
they are supreme. But they are not. They are bound to obey 
unconditionally the captain’s orders. The captain is the consumer.46 
Consumers have the ability to “pay” for their own preferred 
social responsibility of corporations. If they truly value it and 
desire it, then any rational profit-maximizing corporation will 
provide it.47 Consumers and shareholders alike have the power to 
purchase corporate social responsibility outcomes. That is a 
cause and consequence quite distinct from coercively dictating 
those results. As Friedman added, “The stockholders or the 
customers or the employes [sic] could separately spend their own 
money on the particular action if they wished to do so.”48 
Corporations will supply a product that naturally arises in a 
market where consumers demand products that are socially 
responsible and are willing to pay for any additional cost for the 
 
 44 Williams, supra note 1, at 714 (explaining the wealth-maximization view and its 
claims regarding ways that “corporations meet their proper social responsibilities by 
excelling in their economic activities, which then contributes to a well-functioning 
economy . . . .”). 
 45 CLARK, supra note 31, § 16.2. 
 46 LUDWIG VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS 270 (3d rev. ed. 
1963). 
 47 Id. at 648–49. Mises explains: 
All market phenomena are ultimately determined by the choices of the 
consumers. If one wants to apply the notion of power to phenomena of the 
market, one ought to say: in the market all power is vested in the consumers. 
The entrepreneurs are forced, by the necessity of earning profits and avoiding 
losses, to consider in every regard . . . the best possible and cheapest 
satisfaction of the consumers as their supreme directive.  
Id. at 649. 
 48 Friedman, supra note 26, at 33.  
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production of that demanded product. If adding a corporate social 
responsibility element to a product makes the production of the 
corporation’s goods or the provision of the corporation’s services 
more expensive, presumably those additional costs can be 
captured by an increased price that a willing consumer base will 
pay because they value the additional efforts made by the 
corporation.49 
Thus, consumers themselves absorb the costs to the 
corporation for the provision of that socially beneficial good. A 
socially responsible ingredient is added to a product, proactively 
or reactively, and that ingredient meets consumer demand. 
Whether it is a demand for “green” and recycled toilet paper, 
non-GMO corn, fuel-efficient vehicles, energy-conserving 
appliances, or similar products, if purchasers exist, then the 
corporations will label, market, and supply these products.50 
Elsewhere, I have described this corporate reaction as achieving 
socially responsible outcomes as a result of internally induced, 
profit-driven, and voluntary behavior.51 
So long as demand is the sole reason for the provision of the 
good and the consumer market is willing to bear the costs of 
production through higher prices, such corporate actions are 
justified within the wealth-maximization norm. In that case, if 
demand disappears, the corporation is under no compulsion to 
continue providing that good. 
It then becomes the individual responsibility of consumers to 
apply pressure with their own resources, pocketbooks, and 
buying power—rather than the law—to alter corporate behavior. 
Mises explains that the consumers run the show and dictate 
what is made and how it is made. “Their buying and their 
abstention from buying decides who should own and run the 
plants and the farms. They make poor people rich and rich people 
poor. They determine precisely what should be produced, in what 
quality, and in what quantities.”52 
The expansive corporate social responsibility advocates 
would rather, however, push for top-down imposition of corporate 
social responsibility standards forcing corporations and their 
shareholders to accept losses by bankrolling the social programs 
rather than those advocates themselves paying directly for the 
 
 49 See generally Karnani, supra note 40. 
 50 Id. (describing new markets for fuel-efficient cars, energy-conserving products, 
and healthier foods as examples, explaining that “in cases where private profits and 
public interests are aligned, the idea of corporate social responsibility is irrelevant . . . .”). 
 51 Kochan, Mechanization, supra note 27, at 255. 
 52 Id. 
Do Not Delete 3/18/2014 8:16 PM 
2014] Corporate Social Responsibility in a Remedy-Seeking Society 429 
desired behavior and social outcomes. As usual, instead of 
accessing market mechanisms to satisfy their preferences, these 
activist interest groups engage in rent-seeking behavior to obtain 
these social “gains” for some cost less than what they would have 
to pay if bargained for in a free and fair open market exchange.53 
Finally, seemingly altruistic or charitable actions may be 
taken voluntarily by corporations where the impetus for the 
donation or other action is the calculated benefit to profits from 
the action due to an ability to capitalize on marketing, branding, 
or other means of increasing the consumer base or attracting 
additional investors. Reputation enhancing efforts based on these 
criteria of self-interest should be considered internally induced 
and voluntary. These efforts will cease when they are no longer 
profitable for the corporation. If the decision is made in order to 
maximize profits, it falls into this category of voluntary behavior 
that nonetheless leads to concurrently meeting both profit-based 
and social concerns. 
Often, however, as discussed in more detail below, neither 
the wealth-maximization norm and its constraints on corporate 
behavior nor the beneficial effects of corporate profits on society 
are enough to achieve the remedies and results sought by those 
usually advocating for greater social responsibilities. Those 
advocates claim that existing conditions and allocations of profits 
leave other so-called stakeholders or otherwise “affected” 
individuals in unsatisfactory positions.54 They contend that this 
deficiency should be met with more law to constrain the 
operations of the corporations, including an altered definition of 
legal duties owed. 
C.  The Expansive, Remedy-Seeking Notion of Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Its Broader Vision of Corporate Duties and 
Obligations 
Advocates for a broad or progressive notion of corporate 
social responsibility argue that there is, or should be, some 
broader constituency to which a duty is owed beyond 
shareholders,55 those involved in contractual relationships with 
 
 53 See infra Part II. 
 54 Adefolake Adeyeye, The Role of Global Governance in CSR, 9 SANTA CLARA J. 
INT’L L. 147, 149 (2011) (“CSR focuses on the attempt to regulate corporate behavior in 
order to ensure that corporations carry out their activities in consideration to  
multi-stakeholder interests.”). 
 55 Williams, supra note 1, at 716 (“[P]rogressive scholars contend that directors 
ought to consider the impact of their decisions on a wider range of constituents than 
shareholders, and thus ought to consider the implications of their actions on employees, 
consumers, suppliers (in some cases), the community, and the environment.”). 
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the corporation, or those harmed by corporate behavior under 
traditional notions of harm.56 On the latter, corporate social 
responsibility theories sometimes rest on an expanded and 
different kind of definition of harm.57 
As mentioned before, corporate social responsibility has 
many definitions and manifestations. Even among the 
progressive or expansionist advocates of corporate social 
responsibility, there is little agreement as to the goals or 
mechanisms for achieving corporate social responsibility or 
advancing broader stakeholder interests vis-à-vis corporate 
power.58 Professor Larry Ribstein, for example, has explained 
that “[t]he debate over corporate social responsibility is often 
vague or unrealistic or both.”59 He continued that those 
participants seeking greater responsibilities for corporations 
“speak in terms of how corporations ought to be run, without 
specifying the legal changes that will produce these results.”60 
Friedman noted that “[t]he discussions of the ‘social 
responsibilities of business’ are notable for their analytical 
looseness and lack of rigor.”61 Although many expansionist 
corporate social responsibility advocates are united in their 
desire to restrict the universe of acceptable corporate behaviors, 
they are not necessarily in agreement on all positions within that 
broader framework.62 
Despite the sometimes less than cohesive message, corporate 
social responsibility activism, whatever its iteration, has 
strength in its optics. “‘Corporate social responsibility’ is a term 
that sounds difficult to quibble with as a goal. It exudes a sense 
of ‘the good’ or ‘the proper.’”63 After all, it is hard to defend the 
opposite—“irresponsibility.” Much like other terms for 
 
 56 See Millon, supra note 5, at 919 (“The ‘social’ element of CSR is the idea that 
corporations have responsibilities to the broader society.”). 
 57 See Bainbridge, In Defense, supra note 6, at 1432 (corporate social responsibility 
advocates are worried about the costs that corporate actors supposedly impose upon 
nonshareholder “constituencies”). 
 58 Williams, supra note 1, at 775 (“While many advocates of more corporate social 
responsibility share a concern that managing global corporations to maximize shareholder 
wealth has the potential to lead to harmful social effects, including exacerbating 
persistent income inequalities, there is much less agreement about how to suggest 
reforming corporate law to address that concern.”). 
 59 Ribstein, supra note 42, at 1432; see also Williams, supra note 1, at 706 
(expressing similar difficulties with the definition).  
 60 Ribstein, supra note 42, at 1432. 
 61 Friedman, supra note 26, at 33. 
 62 Millon, supra note 5, at 919 (“Even among sympathetic analysts, key questions 
generate controversy. There is disagreement about the role of business in society, the 
persons to whom a business should be responsible, the responsibility that should entail, 
and so on.”). 
 63 Kochan, Mechanization, supra note 27, at 254. 
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movements, corporate social responsibility as captured by the 
expansionist view exudes an image of purity and virtue. At the 
same time, much of the corporate social responsibility advocacy 
paints a very nasty picture of corporate behavior and a very 
myopic view of the (un)worthiness of profit. Profit motive is seen 
as merely (and unseemly) greedy and the contributions of 
economic growth to the betterment of society64 become ignored. 
Moreover, within the advocacy or scholarship on the expansive 
view of corporate social responsibility, there is minimal 
discussion of negative rights, economic liberty, or laissez faire 
philosophy as part of the rubric of what constitutes, or 
contributes to, human rights and freedom.65 Nor is there much 
discussion of the general improvements on the human condition 
that derive from development and investment.66 Those with an 
expansive definition of corporate social responsibility exploit 
every avenue to create a negative image of corporations and 
downplay their positive contributions to society. Either through 
demonization of wealth or simply a fear of the “large,” corporate 
behavior is seen as requiring some external check or control 
especially when we are told that it contributes to the awful 
conditions for many in areas where corporations operate.67 These 
informational and perceptual imbalances further disadvantage 
those forwarding wealth-maximization as the better view. 
In fact, the messaging becomes so powerful and difficult to 
rebut that Friedman warned corporations that they endanger 
themselves when they even enter the fray of a corporate social 
responsibility discussion, because they risk legitimizing the 
terms of the debate as being based in a battle between good and 
 
 64 See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 31, § 16.2 (large organizations like corporations, 
“increase social welfare, because without them certain large-scale business ventures 
would be impossible or would be carried out in a wasteful way”).  
 65 On these concepts and their contribution to social welfare, see 3 FRIEDRICH A. 
HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY (1979); MISES, supra note 46, at 257–326; see 
also generally FRIEDMAN, supra note 26. 
 66 As Adam Smith described:  
Every individual is continually exerting himself to find out the most 
advantageous employment for whatever capital he can command. It is his own 
advantage, indeed, and not that of society, which he has in view. But the study 
of his own advantage naturally, or rather necessarily leads him to prefer 
employment which is most advantageous to the society . . . . [H]e intends only 
his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand 
to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the 
worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest he 
frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really 
intends to promote it. 
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, 
421, 423 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1937) (1776); see also Jan Narveson, The “Invisible Hand,” 
46 J. BUS. ETHICS 201, 201 (2003). 
 67 Adeyeye, supra note 54, at 149. 
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evil.68 He cautioned that corporate managers engaging in 
corporate social responsibility talk are legitimizing the “already 
too prevalent view that the pursuit of profits is wicked and 
immoral and must be curbed and controlled by external forces.”69 
There is little doubt that the jargon painting those directly or 
indirectly (and, often, tenuously at best) affected by corporate 
action as the oppressed, and corporations as their oppressors, 
provides powerful marketing for the social responsibility cause.70 
The expansionist corporate social responsibility view tends to 
be one partly grounded in entitlement and a poorly conceived 
concept of justice and blame.71 When bad things happen in the 
world, people search for someone to blame and expect someone to 
pay.72 Advocates of increased corporate social responsibility—as 
they are searching to find somebody to blame and get 
compensation from—seem to tout the claim that the law must 
provide a “remedy for every wrong.”73 
Not every perceived wrong, financial hardship, disparity, 
inequality, or other perceived hardship can find relief from the 
law and the legal system.74 “While it may seem that there should 
be a remedy for every wrong, this is an ideal limited perforce by 
 
 68 Friedman, supra note 26, at 32. 
 69 Id.  
 70 As I have previously described: 
The marketing of law or ideas is advanced by the terms used to define the 
goals of expanded limitations on corporate behavior: rights, responsibilities, 
duties, human rights, morality, ethics, virtue, equality, accountability, and the 
like. It is against the backdrop of stories of genocide, killings, abuse, 
oppression, despair, poverty, inequality, slavery, starvation, arms, unjust 
imprisonment, apartheid, the Holocaust, greed, [and] selfishness . . . . It is easy 
to “sell” the ideas and projects that seek to solve or remedy these problems. 
Kochan, Mechanization, supra note 27, at 254. 
 71 See Sonja B. Starr, Rethinking “Effective Remedies”: Remedial Deterrence in 
International Courts, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693, 698 (2008) (“International courts and 
scholars habitually invoke the principle of ubi ius ibi remedium—‘where there is a right, 
there is a remedy.’”). 
 72 Millon, supra note 5, at 919 (quoting Joel Bakan categorizing corporations as the 
“externalizing machine” because of corporate potential to ignore adverse third-party 
effects) (quoting JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT AND 
POWER 60–84 (2005)). 
 73 For example, calling on the maxim ubi ius ibi remedium, one author in favor of 
expansive corporate social responsibility and promoting human rights litigation concluded 
that 
[a]llowing corporations and State officials to escape liability for their acts 
simply because they occurred in countries without adequate legal structures to 
address them does damage to the concept of Rule of Law and defeats the whole 
idea that where there is a breach of a legal right, a remedy must attach. 
Emeka Duruigbo, The Economic Cost of Alien Tort Litigation: A Response to Awakening 
Monster: The Alien Tort Statute of 1789, 14 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 40 & n.235 (2004). 
 74 See, e.g., Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 373 (1983) (recognizing that the court will 
not fashion a remedy without a right and even then only when determining congressional 
intent and considering broader policy concerns). 
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the realities of this world.”75 The legal system is not intended to 
provide a legal remedy for every wrong, harm, injury, or 
unfortunate social condition.76 Nor is the legal system responsible 
for constructing itself to deliver a private party to blame and 
force that party to somehow make perceived wrongs right. 
Emotions and tragic stories aside, legal doctrines cannot mold 
themselves to such situations.77 
Before any remedy can be applied or the law constructed in a 
manner to require a payment from one (like a corporation) to 
another (some segment of society benefitted by CSR-based 
investment), there must be a “right” recognized by law. The 
proposed beneficiaries of corporate philanthropy have earned no 
such right. 
That limitation—that only rights are protected—explains 
why the maxim ubi ius ibi remedium loosely translates as 
establishing triggering conditions: for every right, there is a 
remedy. Even that phrase has further limits. Blackstone has 
explained that “it is a general and indisputable rule, that where 
there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy, by suit or 
action at law, whenever that right is invaded . . . . [I]t is a settled 
and invariable principle in the laws of England, that every right 
when with-held must have a remedy, and every injury it’s [sic] 
proper redress.”78 This concept, as explained by Blackstone and 
when understood in context, makes clear that there is only a 
right with a corresponding remedy if we also identify a duty (and 
afterward of course also find some violation of that duty which 
directly causes harm that is traceable to such a violation). 
Every right must have a corresponding duty before one can 
claim any entitlement to action by another. This often-projected 
maxim that “there must be a right for every wrong” is improperly 
invoked if there is not a rights/duty analysis.79 And only those 
who have that duty or obligation can be sued or otherwise held 
responsible for a wrong (not to mention all of the other hurdles 
 
 75 Tobin v. Grossman, 249 N.E.2d 419, 424 (N.Y. 1969) (explaining the facts of our 
system that the limits of the law mean that there are “limit[s] to attaining essential 
justice”). 
 76 Hall v. Trisun, No. CIVA SA05CA0984 OG, 2005 WL 3348956 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 16, 
2005) (“Plaintiff is advised that the law does not provide a remedy for every injury 
suffered. Moreover, the jurisdiction of a federal court to resolve disputes is inherently 
limited.”). 
 77 See Howard v. Lecher, 366 N.E.2d 64, 66 (N.Y. 1977) (discussing that even where 
the “temptation is great to offer . . . some form of relief,” it is “not the function of the law” 
to provide a remedy for every wrong). 
 78 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 23, 109 (Univ. 
of Chicago Press 2002) (1765). 
 79 See Perodeau v. City of Hartford, 792 A.2d 752, 768 (Conn. 2002). 
Do Not Delete 3/18/2014 8:16 PM 
434 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 17:2 
like causation that must then be proved). Many attempts to 
increase the scope of corporate liability face these hurdles. The 
reality is that reform cannot always be accomplished through the 
imposition of new legal rules, although that fact may be 
unsatisfactory to those looking for their concept of justice.80 
Despite all the ills of the world, we must maintain the limits of 
the law, and we should appreciate what the law can and cannot 
do effectively.81 
The rhetoric of corporate social responsibility sometimes 
ignores these bedrock principles and necessary prerequisites to 
the identification of legitimate legal obligations. At other times, 
expansionist advocates seek to redefine human relations and 
expand the concept of duty far beyond any meaningful constraint. 
They begin to invest in the creation of law or legal liability 
regimes to advance their interests. Corporate social 
responsibility activism illustrates that segments of society 
believe that cures for all things that are seemingly wrong in 
society may be found in the creation of law or the imposition of 
new legal liabilities. We live in a remedy-seeking society that 
often embraces these ideas of liability hunting. And, in the sense 
that these activists push for an alteration in corporate duties to 
obtain the remedies they seek, those groups are remedy-seeking 
through rent-seeking, as will be discussed in the next Part. Yet, 
there must be limits to the capacity of the law to accomplish 
these ends. 
In the end, modern expansionist notions of corporate social 
responsibility can be seen as seeking an alteration in behavior—a 
new ethic in corporate conduct based on the desire to alter 
corporate behavior to achieve certain socially desirable outcomes. 
It seeks to identify harms, isolate causes of such harms, control 
negative externalities from doing business, and concomitantly 
induce or force corporations to internalize the purported larger 
costs and broader range of impacts from their actions.82 The 
proliferation of expansive corporate social responsibility efforts 
has been effective at inducing changes in corporate behavior—
leaving aside whether or not such changes are wise. 
 
 80 James R. Adams, From Babel to Reason: An Examination of the Duty Issue, 31 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 25, 53 (1999) (“Tort law does not provide a remedy for every harm. We 
cannot solve every social problem by simply ‘passing a law.’ There are many ways to 
control conduct; tort law is but one.”). 
 81 Tobin v. Grossman, 249 N.E.2d 419, 424 (N.Y. 1969) (“The problem for the law is 
to limit the legal consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree,” and therefore 
attenuated causation cannot be actionable). 
 82 Millon, supra note 5, at 919 (discussing the “social costs” that a profitable 
corporation can impose). 
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Just as the measure and the meaning of corporate social 
responsibility are varied, the mechanisms for achieving the aims 
of those favoring an expanded notion of corporate social 
responsibility can equally take a number of different forms. Some 
of these involve bottom-up private market forces while others 
seek to alter the legal landscape top-down with fundamental 
changes in statutes, judicially recognized common law or 
statutory liabilities, or other legal outlets for reform. 
D.  The Tactical Basics for Reformers: What Can Law Do to 
Affect Greater Corporate Social Responsibility?  
In past work, I characterized some of the mechanisms that 
could accomplish corporate social responsibility objectives along a 
spectrum of increasing levels of coercive rules—from 
non-coercive, voluntary decisions by corporations aligned with 
their own interests in wealth-maximization all the way to the 
highest levels of coercively induced mechanisms of command and 
control over the decision-making of corporations and their 
distributions of profits.83 In this section, I want to focus on just a 
few of the more specific efforts that can be taken to try to achieve 
one’s corporate social responsibility objectives. 
As explained above, the first (and most legitimate) option for 
achieving one’s desired corporate social responsibility results is 
through purchasing the outcome. If, indeed, consumers demand a 
particular corporate effort that they deem socially desirable, then 
the consumer demand is enough incentive for a 
profit-maximizing corporation to provide that corporate social 
responsibility “product.” Despite all the talk about the big bad 
powerful “corporations” in expansive corporate social 
responsibility and other progressive rhetoric, it is the consumers, 
after all, that have the power.84 Mises again explains that, 
“[o]wnership of material factors of production as well as 
entrepreneurial or technological skill do not—in the market 
economy—bestow power in the coercive sense. All they grant is 
the privilege to serve the real masters of the market, the 
consumers, in a more exalted position than other people.”85 The 
price of the goods or services will be adjusted upward if they have 
added costs from social responsibility efforts included in the 
production of goods or provision of services. But, presumably, if 
 
 83 Kochan, Mechanization, supra note 27, at 255–57. 
 84 MISES, supra note 46, at 649 (“It is customary nowadays to signify the position 
which the owners of property and the entrepreneurs occupy on the market as economic 
power or market power. This terminology is misleading when applied to the conditions of 
the market.”). 
 85 Id. (emphasis added). 
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consumers desire that extra “CSR ingredient” in the product, 
then they will be willing to pay the higher price. It will be an 
incident (or an accident) of the corporation making 
wealth-maximization decisions. 
Corporate social responsibility advocates can also try to work 
within existing law to compel corporate decisions that are 
socially responsible in the advocates’ minds. Advocates can 
become shareholders and try to change things from the inside—
through, for example, voting their shares, proxy solicitations, 
hostile takeovers, direct lawsuits, derivative lawsuits, and other 
means. Admittedly these options will be constrained so long as 
the legal definitions of duty remain aligned with the 
wealth-maximization model. Thus, the more effective technique 
for these interest groups is to use these avenues as a way to 
attempt change regarding the contours of board of directors’ 
duties and the vision of the corporate role. There is a part of the 
corporate social responsibility movement that tries to change the 
governing rules or metrics of corporate decision-making—to limit 
the range of acceptable corporate profit decisions and allow more 
room or even mandate so-called socially responsible choices or 
stakeholder concerns to be taken into account. The advocates 
would need to overcome the default rules and convince a 
corporation to structure itself with different standards and 
duties, or they would need to convince the judiciary to amend 
traditional notions of fiduciary duties. Again, these are difficult 
tasks but it may be worthwhile for advocates to invest in these 
efforts to cause legal change. 
When unable to achieve their corporate social responsibility 
objectives within corporate law or through a change in the rules 
of traditional corporate governance, the corporate social 
responsibility lobby diverts its attention and resources elsewhere. 
Corporate social responsibility advocates may seek legislation 
that imposes new duties on corporations and their boards of 
directors that align with the social interests of the advocates. 
So-called “stakeholder statutes” or “constituency statutes” 
allowing or requiring corporations to take stakeholders into 
account in decision-making are obvious examples of these 
efforts.86 
 
 86 See generally Kathleen Hale, Note, Corporate Law and Stakeholders: Moving 
Beyond Stakeholder Statutes, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 823, 833 (2003) (describing stakeholder 
statutes); Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework for Enforcing 
Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579 (1992) (discussing the constituency 
statute approach). More recently, we have also seen “social enterprise” statutes and 
“benefit corporation” regimes emerge that attempt to further similar goals. See, e.g., Brian 
D. Galle, Social Enterprise: Who Needs It?, 54 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available 
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The corporate social responsibility lobby can also seek to 
change the substantive law—to regulate the conduct of business 
activities or to create new duties or liabilities for certain entities 
and certain behaviors. The expansion of the operating liabilities 
of businesses and the narrowing of acceptable practices by 
creating substantive prohibitions or tort liabilities for corporate 
actions can be accomplished by changing the contents of 
legislative or regulatory standards. And, these substantive rules 
can also be changed in the courts through the development of 
new liability schemes, identification of new harms, or creation of 
new duties. 
Rather than convincing corporations to change their 
decision-making calculus or transforming their concept of duty, 
and rather than seeking legislation or judicial standards 
generally altering the definition of a corporation’s fiduciary 
duties to include secondary stakeholders, corporate social 
responsibility advocates often seek to manipulate the substantive 
law to force corporations into making corporate social 
responsibility investments—to the detriment of shareholder 
interests—through means of pressure quite apart from truly 
voluntary decision-making choice. This is accomplished, in part, 
by creating an atmosphere of threatened liability that changes 
the respective bargaining power of the corporate social 
responsibility lobby and arms them with substantial leverage 
which it can deploy against corporations in efforts to “convince” 
corporations to change behaviors.87 The effects are no less 
damaging than outright legislatively demanded changes in 
corporate law. Corporations shift resources into suboptimal 
investments in secondary stakeholder concerns at the expense of 
distributing profits to their primary shareholders. It diverts 
resources and misallocates profits into non-shareholder 
investments. The beauty of such efforts for the corporate social 
responsibility lobby is that even if they are not entirely successful 
in creating law (or even when any such efforts have not yet been 
completed), the corporate social responsibility lobby can start to 
use the threat of law and the threat of completing a legal regime 
to change the power dynamics.88 The corporate social 
responsibility lobby can leverage the possible creation of law or 
 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2302658 (discussing the political economy of social enterprise 
statutes and questioning the motives and effectiveness of such legislation). 
 87 Robert S. Adler & Elliot M. Silverstein, When David Meets Goliath: Dealing with 
Power Differentials in Negotiation, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 5 (2000) (“The degree of 
power that each party brings to the negotiation affects the room for maneuver that each 
feels is available in bargaining situations.”). 
 88 Id. at 20 (discussing power dynamics between litigating parties). 
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the risk of adverse judgments in a manner that paints 
corporations into a corner, stimulating changes in behavior to 
stave off the threatened legal maneuver.89 
Whatever the means—or at least those means outside of 
engaging, as consumers or otherwise, in truly voluntary contracts 
with corporations—used to seek a remedy for the harms 
expansive corporate social responsibility advocates believe are 
the fault of corporate behavior and attributable to the traditional 
corporate wealth-maximization model, these advocates are acting 
in a manner consistent with public choice models of interest 
group behavior. Whether through seeking legislation, litigation 
advancing novel theories of liability for corporate behaviors such 
as for “aiding and abetting” nasty foreign regimes, shareholder 
activism, derivative suits, or other means, corporate social 
responsibility advocacy operatives meet the classic definition of 
interest groups and should be treated with the same skepticism 
as we might give anyone attempting to manipulate the law for 
private gain. These advocates are advancing their own agendas 
and the wealth and power of their own organizations in the 
process of seeking special treatment from the law. 
While expansive corporate social responsibility advocates 
may claim that their efforts to change the law are for “the public 
interest” or the overall “social good,” they are asking for a wealth 
transfer from the corporations and their shareholders to those 
who will supposedly benefit from the corporate social 
responsibility efforts demanded. Expansive corporate social 
responsibility efforts are redistributive in nature. The 
concentrated corporate social responsibility interest groups seek 
payments in the form of corporate social responsibility reforms or 
measures by the corporation, and the costs of complying are 
borne by the shareholders in the form of sacrificed profits. 
There is no reason to believe that corporate social 
responsibility advocates are any less inclined to tap into the law 
as a means of serving their ends. The next Part will explain how 
these efforts by corporate social responsibility activists 
dangerously conscript the law for inappropriate means. Legal 
rules should not be fitted through manipulation as 
outcome-based vehicles for social reform. 
 
 89 Id. 
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II. CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY ADVOCATES  
AND LITIGANTS AS INTEREST GROUPS IN A  
PUBLIC CHOICE  PERSPECTIVE 
This Part introduces public choice theory to set forth the 
primary lesson of this Article—expansive corporate social 
responsibility advocacy should be viewed in light of what we 
know about interest group politics. We should not pay any special 
deference to the aims of these seemingly beneficial groups simply 
because their names and cause sound in the public interest. 
Corporate social responsibility advocacy is still private interest 
advocacy and any attempt to use the law to reposition one’s 
status within the bargaining market is, indeed, still rent-seeking, 
despite the “social responsibility” labels. 
Rent-seeking and private advantage are often behind 
legislation, regulation, and the creation of law generally.90 
Corporate social responsibility lawmaking efforts may sound like 
they are in the “public interest,”91 and for a long time the 
dominant theory in political science presumed that legislation 
was and could be crafted with social welfare enhancing effects 
and intent.92 This concept that laws can be created for some 
common good isolated from interest group influence has been 
challenged by public choice theory,93 exposing the public interest 
model to the real world operations and effects of interest group 
influence in legal and political decision-making.94 Public choice 
theory “burst[s] the bubble” of the public interest model and 
attempts to recast our critique of legislation and other law 
creation with an understanding that even those with benign or 
inherently good sounding motives or causes are nonetheless 
seeking private interest gains.95 
 
 90 MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND 
APPLICATIONS IN LAW 46 (2009) (explaining rents and rent-seeking). 
 91 Andrew P. Morriss, Bruce Yandle & Andrew Dorchak, Choosing How to Regulate, 
29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 179, 214 (2005) [hereinafter Morriss et al., Choosing] (discussing 
the history of public interest theory). 
 92 Id. at 215. 
 93 James Buchanan, Politics Without Romance: A Sketch of Positive Public Choice 
Theory and Its Normative Implications, in THE THEORY OF PUBLIC CHOICE-II 11 (James 
Buchanan & Gordon Tullock eds., 1984) (explaining that the truths exposed by public 
choice destroyed the romance of public interest theory). 
 94 STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 90, at 44–45 (contrasting the public interest and 
public choice models). 
 95 Paul Boudreaux, Eminent Domain, Property Rights, and the Solution of 
Representation Reinforcement, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 18 (2005) (public choice theory 
“burst the bubble” of the civic republic model by explaining that “[l]aws adopted 
ostensibly to help the public are in reality the masked use of government to help one 
group at the expense of others – be it business interests who are helped by regulation of 
their competitors or outdoor enthusiasts aided by laws restricting private development in 
parklands”). 
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Public choice theory looks at the world of legislation and 
other avenues of law creation as marketplaces for the production 
of goods desired by interest groups. The law suppliers—usually 
legislators but also including courts—have the ability to produce 
such goods96 upon demand from interest groups and the interest 
groups will pay to acquire the goods (so long as it is more efficient 
than paying for the same result in an open marketplace without 
the legislation).97 
In corporate social responsibility, the expansionist interest 
groups see their opposition, or competition, as the businesses 
upon which they seek to impose higher standards. While the 
expansionist lobby could negotiate in the private market with 
businesses to encourage changes in behavior, such bargaining 
would be costly. It may often be less expensive for advocacy 
groups to obtain the same result—changes in corporate 
behavior—by spending their budget on changing legal rules to 
their advantage. This includes seeking legislation to advance 
their interests, developing litigation strategies to create 
liabilities for corporations, and the like.98 We should expect the 
expansionist corporate social responsibility lobby’s resources will 
be directed to the law making realm when achieving gains there 
is less costly than bargaining for such gains. 
Interest-group consumers of the laws supplied usually 
benefit quite separate and apart from any concern over the 
greater social welfare (even if that legislation is given a general 
welfare spin in order to market to the public that legislation or 
other legal outcome as a positive for the public good).99 When it 
comes to information, interest groups have a leg up. Interest 
groups are more savvy and experienced at controlling the flow of 
information than individual citizens, and thus those interest 
groups are able to manage the message so that the public and its 
legislators have reason to support the legislation or other 
changes in law that the interest group favors.100 
 
 96 Robert D. Tollison, The Economic Theory of Rent Seeking, 152 PUB. CHOICE 73, 80 
(2012) [hereinafter Tollison, Economic Theory] (discussing the supply and demand of 
legislation). 
 97 See, e.g., George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & 
MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971); Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339 
(1988).  
 98 See Rubin et al., supra note 8, at 295–96. 
 99 Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory 
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 227 (1986) [hereinafter 
Macey, Public-Regarding] (“Interest group theory treats statutes as commodities that are 
purchased by particular interest groups or coalitions of interest groups that outbid and 
outmaneuver competing interest groups.”). 
 100 See NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN & SHIRLEY ELDER, INTERESTS GROUPS, LOBBYING AND 
POLICYMAKING 75–76 (Robert L. Peabody ed., 1978). 
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The idea is to obtain something of value by spending less on 
the lobbying, litigating, and other payments needed to get that 
something from the government than one would need to spend in 
a free and openly competitive marketplace where they would 
have to negotiate with other private parties to obtain that same 
something of value.101 This process of “rent-seeking”102 is the 
expenditure of resources to obtain this something of value—often 
an alteration in legal status that directly props up the seeker’s 
bargaining position but at other times some alteration that 
simply knocks down a competitor’s status.103 A rational interest 
group will invest in the cheapest alternative mechanism to 
achieve their desired results.104 When working for legal change 
becomes more expensive than seeking a private market 
resolution, interest group behavior is channeled back again to 
that private market.105 When one can obtain a rent—the positive 
savings differential between the high cost of obtaining something 
in the market and the lower cost of obtaining the same thing 
through legal institutions—then the rational investor will seek 
that rent. 
For rent-seeking deals to succeed the public needs to be left 
with the perception that the actions of legislators are public 
minded and that the actions of courts are independent and free 
from outside manipulation for private gains; and, the public must 
be left with little reason to suspect the existence of 
private-advantage deals that transfer wealth from individual 
taxpayers.106 Quite often due to the concept of “masking,” despite 
legislation or other alterations of legal rules having the effect of 
promoting a specific interest group’s agenda (often at the expense 
of the public), the face of the legislation or legal rule is designed 
to make the public believe that it, the public, is the true 
beneficiary of the law. As a result of such a belief, the public is 
 
 101 See generally Daniel A. Farber & Philip Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public 
Choice, 65 TEX L. REV. 873 (1987). 
 102 Id.; see also generally Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, 
and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224, 232 (1967); Tollison, Economic Theory, supra note 96, at 80 
(describing rent-seeking). 
 103 STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 90, at 50 (defining rent-seeking as “meaning 
affirmative lobbying efforts to secure beneficial legal protections against competition”).  
 104 Tollison, Economic Theory, supra note 96, at 80 (“[G]roups who can organize for 
less than a dollar in order to obtain a dollar of benefits from legislation will be the 
effective demanders of transfers.”). 
 105 STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 90, at 46 (“[A]n economic rent arises when an 
economic activity, for example labor, earns a return that exceeds the opportunity cost of 
the income-producing asset.”). 
 106 Morriss et al., Choosing, supra note 91, at 225 (“Politicians . . . seek to minimize 
their own costs when acting on behalf of interest groups or the general public.”). 
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less likely to question the law and light never shines on the less 
scrupulous interest group bargain behind the mask.107 
This masking concept is also sometimes referred to as a 
curtain, cloak, or veil of legitimacy.108 Masking works to shield 
interest group-motivated changes in the law from scrutiny 
because it hides the costs of the activity behind a veil of a 
seemingly positive goal. Masking plays a critical role in 
rent-seeking’s successes,109 and corporate social responsibility 
advocates are in a strong starting position given the comparative 
“good versus evil” optics discussed in Part I.110 As Professor 
Harry Hutchison has explained, “Properly understood, the 
corporate social responsibility model allows some to exercise 
their preferences at the expense of others while couching that 
exercise in wonderful sounding language.”111 
When such a mask is effective, of course, it diminishes 
opposition and makes the rent-seeking successful because there 
is little resistance to the legal movement or the change 
achieved.112 In the end, rent-seeking processes are damaging and 
dangerous because they result in misallocation of resources in 
 
 107 John O. McGinnis, The Bar Against Challenges to Employment Discrimination 
Consent Decrees: A Public Choice Perspective, 54 LA. L. REV. 1507, 1530–31 (1994) 
(explaining the means by which politicians can raise the information costs for those 
opposing their actions by disguising the true objectives of their actions); Todd J. Zywicki, 
Environmental Externalities and Political Externalities: The Political Economy of 
Environmental Regulation and Reform, 73 TUL. L. REV. 845, 890 (1999) [hereinafter 
Zywicki, Externalities] (discussing why the rational voter will have no incentive to spend 
time or money to discover illegitimate wealth transfers and interest group deals).  
 108 See Rebecca M. Kysar, Listening to Congress: Earmark Rules and Statutory 
Interpretation, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 519, 580 (2009) (discussing masking special interest 
legislation); POLITICAL ENVIRONMENTALISM: GOING BEHIND THE GREEN CURTAIN (Terry L. 
Anderson ed., 2000) (discussing the curtain behind which private interest deals hide); 
Jonathan H. Adler, Rent Seeking Behind the Green Curtain, REG., Fall 1996, at 26–34 
(1996) (curtain concept); Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Penalty Default Canon, 
72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 663, 678 (2004) (discussing a legislative public interest “cloak”); 
Gregory C. Shaffer, How Business Shapes Law: A Socio-Legal Framework, 42 CONN. L. 
REV. 147, 155 (2009) (“In some cases, ‘public interest’ statutes may serve as a facade, 
providing a symbol of government concern while masking government inaction.”); Michael 
Abramowicz & Thomas B. Colby, Notice-and-Comment Judicial Decisionmaking, 76 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 965, 1013 (2009) (discussing rulemaking “charades”). 
 109 Macey, Public-Regarding, supra note 99, at 251. 
 110 See supra notes 63–82 and accompanying text. 
 111 Harry G. Hutchison, Director Primacy and Corporate Governance: Shareholder 
Voting Rights Captured by the Accountability/Authority Paradigm, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 
1111, 1135 n.141 (2005). Hutchison further explains that “[a]s thus understood, the 
corporate social responsibility model is merely one of many conventional models of 
corporate governance in which actors often exercise their own self-interest and as such, 
the claim that this model exists in some counter-hegemonic sense remains highly 
speculative.” Id. 
 112 Macey, Public-Regarding, supra note 99, at 232. 
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society,113 forcing individuals to waste money seeking these “law” 
goods and forcing their competitors to spend money opposing the 
same. All the while wealth is being coercively transferred in 
unnatural and unproductive ways.114 
Lessons can be learned for the corporate social responsibility 
mask from other seemingly wonderful terms like social justice, 
environmental sustainability, or others infused with a sense of 
the public good. Such terms readily attach themselves to 
lawmaking efforts as part of the masking effort.115 Whether it is 
labor unions, the plaintiffs’ bar, human rights organizations, 
corporate social responsibility activists, or the like, these groups 
are advancing a cause that appears as though it is in the “public 
interest,” but public choice teaches us that is seldom the full 
dynamic. 
This Article started with the promise to make the case that 
corporate social responsibility advocates are interest groups too, 
and that is precisely the point here. While many people associate 
interest groups or “special interests” only with businesses or 
other overtly profit-driven enterprises, “social” or “public 
 
 113 Richard L. Hasen, Lobbying, Rent-Seeking, and the Constitution, 64 STAN. L. REV. 
191, 232 (2012) (explaining the likely billions lost and other inefficiencies each year from 
rent-seeking legislation); Tollison, Economic Theory, supra note 96, at 74 (explaining why 
spending to obtain rent-seeking legislation produces nothing of value and diverts 
resources from more important investments); see also Nicolas Loris, The Wind Production 
Tax Credit and the Case for Ending All Energy Subsidies, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 
323, 327–28 (2013). Loris explains, by example, that “[t]he resources a banana producer 
used for lobbying for banana tariffs or an extension of the banana tax credit could have 
been spent actually growing and selling bananas. Rather than engaging in profit-seeking 
behavior in the marketplace, the producer is engaging in rent-seeking behavior in the 
political process.” Id. at 327. 
 114 Hasen, supra note 113, at 197 (discussing the diversion of funds by rent-seeking 
and interest group legislation into nonproductive uses); Macey, Public-Regarding, supra 
note 99, at 230 (explaining that most laws obtained through rent-seeking “enrich the few 
at the expense of the many”). Empirical study reveals that these opportunity costs, 
diverted resources, and negative effects on economic growth and entrepreneurship are 
real: 
  Economist Russell Sobel of West Virginia University defines rent-seeking 
as unproductive entrepreneurship. Political efforts made by rent-seeking 
companies could have been channeled toward productive uses instead of 
distorting economic activity. Sobel found that states that provide more political 
preferences have higher levels of unproductive entrepreneurship and lower 
levels of productive entrepreneurship, and therefore have slower economic 
growth. 
Loris, supra note 113, at 328 (citing Russell Sobel, Testing Baumol: Institutional Quality 
and the Productivity of Entrepreneurship, 23 J. BUS. VENTURING 641, 646 (2008)). 
 115 Georgette Chapman Poindexter, Land Hungry, 21 J.L. & POL. 293, 319 (2005) 
(providing examples of when public interest-looking groups are often “purely self 
interested actors” that rely on concepts like the “environment,” “social justice,” and 
“preservation” as cover); see also, e.g., Donald J. Kochan, “Public Use” and the 
Independent Judiciary: Condemnation in an Interest-Group Perspective, 3 TEX. REV. L. & 
POL. 49 (1998) (discussing interest group influences and masking in eminent domain). 
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interest” organizations seek to profit from the manipulation of 
legal standards in much the same way as any other groups. 
For example, Sheehan explains why non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs)—the same groups that often appear as the 
public face for corporate social responsibility initiatives—are 
often perceived as public-interested but have the same 
self-interested agenda as any other interest group: 
NGOs have a political ideology. Most believe that the private sector 
cannot solve environmental problems and that governments must 
control economic decision-making to protect the environment. This 
belief may be quite sincere, but it is also rooted in self-interest. Many 
NGOs depend on governments for jobs, money and power. They seek 
out grants and contracts from national governments and international 
agencies. They also bask in the recognition they receive from public 
agencies, which adds authority to their pronouncements and brings 
their leaders prestige.116 
NGOs get more funding if they have successes to market to 
their membership, and with more funding comes greater job 
security and growth of the organization.117 As I have described in 
past work, the same motivations exist within human rights and 
international law advocacy organizations, sometimes being the 
very same groups that put corporate social responsibility at the 
top of their agendas or at least align themselves with other 
expansive corporate social responsibility groups.118 
Environmentalism is a theme sometimes incorporated in 
social responsibility, and, even when not cast directly as a 
corporate social responsibility issue, it often has a very similar 
tone as corporate social responsibility activism does in public 
discussions. Professor Todd Zywicki has analyzed how 
environmental public interest groups try to dominate the public 
debate with high-sounding ideals when in fact they are seeking 
private interest legal outcomes.119 The mask provided by such 
 
 116 JAMES M. SHEEHAN, GLOBAL GREENS 2 (1998). See also generally JEREMY RABKIN 
& JAMES SHEEHAN, GLOBAL GREENS, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (1999). 
 117 Todd J. Zywicki, Baptists?: The Political Economy of Environmental Interest 
Groups, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 315, 316–18 (2002) [hereinafter Zywicki, Baptists] 
(“Their activities can be understood as being identical to those of any other interest group 
– namely, the desire to use the coercive power of government to subsidize their personal 
desires for greater environmental protection and to redistribute wealth and power to 
themselves.”). 
 118 See Donald J. Kochan, The Political Economy of the Production of Customary 
International Law: The Role of Non-governmental Organizations in U.S Courts, 22 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 240 (2004) [hereinafter Kochan, Political Economy]. 
 119 Zywicki explains: 
  Environmentalists often claim that environmental activist groups and 
environmental regulation is animated by the “public interest,” i.e., an 
outpouring of “civic republicanism” that causes individuals to overcome their 
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environmental groups and their seemingly noble intentions 
provide a very effective diversion.120 Environmental groups—like 
most corporate social responsibility advocates—claim that their 
cause is bigger and better, more humane, and more basic than 
profit. Yet, there is little cause to believe that they are using the 
law in any more noble or just way than any business-based 
interest group.121 
These “public interest” groups have characteristics that 
qualify them for scrutiny as interest groups no different from 
corporate interest groups, military-industrial interest groups, or 
others that often have that “special interest” label slapped on 
them as a pejorative. Sargent explains that “[a]ssertions of 
fairness, ‘the public interest,’ social justice, and equality thus are 
often perceived within the law and economics tradition as masks 
for the self-interest, as rhetorical dodges deflecting attention 
from the play of conflicting interests.”122 These public 
interest-labeled groups (including corporate social responsibility 
groups) seek to maximize their budgets, maximize influence, 
maximize membership, secure their jobs, and in the case of 
corporate social responsibility sometimes directly effectuate 
wealth transfers into their organizations or constituencies (e.g., 
from shareholders to stakeholders). 
Such wealth transfers can occur through projects or 
programs designed to provide aid and assistance to corporate 
social responsibility stakeholders, payments of increased wages, 
settlements in lawsuits, or other goods provided by the 
corporations at the expense of their shareholders and in favor of 
 
narrow self-interest and to support wide-ranging environmental regulatory 
policies . . . . [A] brief review of the evidence suggests that the public interest 
model has little descriptive accuracy with respect to the behavior of 
environmental interest groups. 
Zywicki, Baptists, supra note 117, at 325–26; see also Zywicki, Externalities, supra note 
107, at 856–88 (explaining empirically the political economy of environmental interests 
groups); POLITICAL ENVIRONMENTALISM, supra note 108; Adler, supra note 108, at 26; 
Macey, Public-Regarding, supra note 99, at 232 n.46 (“Even regulations that have long  
been thought to accomplish such worthy goals as improving the environment recently 
have been shown to benefit special interests.”). 
 120 Zywicki, Baptists, supra note 117, at 336 (“[T]he stranglehold that environmental 
lobbyists exercise over environmental policy-making is the result of the public perception 
that these groups are, in fact, acting according to the public interest.”).  
 121 Id. at 349 (finding “little obvious difference between environmental activists who 
want more for their projects, and farmers, defense contractors, or thousands of others who 
use the political process to redistribute money from the public to the goals preferred by 
their well-organized and influential interest groups”). 
 122 Mark A. Sargent, Utility, the Good and Civic Happiness: A Catholic Critique of 
Law and Economics, 44 J. CATH. LEG. STUD. 35, 42 (2005); see also Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, Law and Economics: An Apologia, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL 
THOUGHT 208, 209 (Michael W. McConnell et al. eds., 2001). 
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these outside stakeholders. Despite their public interest exterior, 
there is no reason to treat corporate social responsibility groups 
as anything different. They are trying to maximize their own 
self-interest at the expense of others and will take advantage of 
rent-seeking opportunities that are available to them.   
In addition to having their own institutional interests as 
advocacy groups in mind and profiting from lawmaking successes 
by support and funding, these social policy groups engage in 
remedy-seeking through rent-seeking. They see ills in the world 
and believe that transfers of wealth accomplished through the 
creation of legal rules are necessary to create a remedy for those 
ills. They seek to impose new duties well beyond the limits that 
would otherwise be imposed under our traditional notions of 
liability for direct actions with proof of causation of harms 
themselves traditionally defined and limited. Such groups would 
rather obtain a benefit at a lower cost than these groups would 
be required to pay if they were forced to bargain in a free market 
for their preferred outcomes.123 Again, so long as the public 
believes that their activities are public spirited, then their efforts 
at making law will often move forward relatively unimpeded. 
As discussed in the previous Part, corporate social 
responsibility advocates can use market mechanisms, acquire 
stock and try to influence corporations and effect change from the 
inside through voting and corporate governance techniques, 
bargain as an outsider for corporate change, seek legislation or 
regulation to advance their interests, create liability schemes in 
the courts, use derivative and direct shareholder lawsuits to alter 
corporate behavior or to discipline corporate “misbehavior,” or 
use other shareholder activism techniques. Within the 
mechanisms listed, in all but the most benign voluntary 
exchanges for, and purchases of, corporate social responsibility 
outcomes where no changes in law would be necessary to 
accomplish the ends, corporate social responsibility advocates 
stand to benefit if they can achieve an alteration of law in favor 
of their interests. Corporate social responsibility groups engage 
in rent-seeking behavior to alter legal rules. They invest in 
outcomes like stakeholder legislation, for example, in the same 
way that a corporation looks to Congress for a tax advantage or 
other corporate subsidy. 
Where possible (and less expensive than private bargaining), 
these corporate social responsibility groups will want to tip the 
 
 123 Zywicki, Baptists, supra note 117, at 349 (environmental rent-seeking helps 
groups avoid costlier marketplace alternatives). 
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law in their favor. There are incentives to make an investment in 
the creation of law that will put the investor—here, the corporate 
social responsibility advocates—in a strategically advantaged 
position vis-à-vis competitors or others in the marketplace—here, 
principally corporations—where transactions would otherwise be 
free, on equal footing, and at arm’s length. 
As mentioned earlier, public choice typically focuses on the 
incentives for interest groups to invest in the production of 
legislation beneficial to its interests and giving it a strategic 
advantage—the creation of rents—not available in the private 
marketplace.124 Similar analysis, however, can be applied to the 
production of law generally. Public choice theory construed 
broadly includes a description of rent-seeking investments in law 
creation in any form to accomplish changes in legal status.125 
Most specifically for purposes of this Article’s analysis, 
interest groups will invest in the production of liability regimes 
within the judicial system that similarly advantage the interest 
group or disadvantage their competitors.126 So liability here 
focuses less on altering firm governance standards than it does 
on limiting the scope of acceptable/legal firm decisions.127 The 
first success lies in creating the new duty with a corresponding 
liability. The secondary benefit lies in the mere threat and 
leverage that comes from having a new doctrine to wield against 
an adversary. Where the mere existence of the threat of liability 
regime can disadvantage the corporation at the bargaining table, 
it is worthwhile for the interest group seeking to alter the 
corporate behavior to invest in early stage developing of novel 
liability theories.128 Seeking legal change to obtain valuable 
 
 124 See, e.g., Gordon Tullock, Rent Seeking, in 7 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS 95 (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008). 
 125 Rubin et al., supra note 8, at 295–97 (noting that “[m]ost public choice analyses 
stop with the passage of interest group legislation” but, drawing on empirical examples, 
stressing the relevance of applying the same principles to incentives in using litigation for 
rent-seeking ends). 
 126 Id. at 295 (“[I]nterest groups can sometimes use the common law litigation process 
for benefit seeking. We provide a model of the decision by an interest group as to whether 
to use the litigation process or traditional lobbying for the purpose of obtaining benefits 
from government, and show that the model has empirical relevance.”).  
 127 See, e.g., ANDREW P. MORRISS ET AL., REGULATION BY LITIGATION (2009) 
(describing several case studies where interest group outcomes were sought and achieved 
through civil litigation models). 
 128 See Emanuela Carbonara & Francesco Parisi, Rent-Seeking and Litigation: The 
Hidden Virtues of the Loser-Pays Rule 3 (Minn. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, 
Research Paper No. 12-39, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2144800 (“When 
parties litigate, they normally expend resources to improve their odds of winning . . . . 
Economists describe such situations, where parties expend resources to improve their 
share of (or probability of winning) fixed stake as ‘rent-seeking,’ which is how the law and 
economics literature has predominantly analyzed litigation costs.”).  
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leverage above and beyond their bargaining position without the 
law provides rents to the corporate social responsibility interest 
groups.129 The existence or nonexistence of a liability regime for 
the behavior targeted for change affects the relative power of 
expansionist interest groups to extract promises from corporation 
to change behavior.130 Even if it is just in the investment in law 
in order to create a threat of liability, it will make sense for an 
interest group to invest in shifting the legal rules if the existence 
of that threat can thereby alter the bargaining power—i.e., create 
leverage.131 
As civil litigation emerges to promote corporate social 
responsibility through liability regimes, the remedy the plaintiffs’ 
attorneys and advocates are seeking often extends beyond relief 
for the particular plaintiff in a case. The goal is bigger.132 
Additional goals include changing corporate behavior,133 
promoting public policy,134 obtaining declarations of public 
norms,135 sparking “institutional reform,”136 and the like.137 In 
the ATS situation, for example, it involves the transformation of 
 
 129 See, e.g., Kal Raustiala, Commentary: Density and Conflict in International 
Intellectual Property Law, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1021, 1034 (2007) (discussing as an 
example the phenomena in intellectual property law involving “rent-seeking efforts by 
producers, who try to use the lawmaking process to leverage their political strength in an 
effort to segment and protect markets against increasing competition”). 
 130 Adler & Silverstein, supra note 87, at 20. 
 131 Rubin et al., supra note 8, at 303–08 (explaining the use of tort litigation, for 
example, as interest-group motivated rent-seeking and the empirically proven 
comparative advantages and successes of plaintiffs in this forum vis-à-vis business 
interests). 
 132 Beth Stephens, Translating Filártiga: A Comparative and International Law 
Analysis of Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 1, 14 (2002) (“This trend of public interest litigation predisposes the U.S. public, 
judiciary, and legal advocates to view civil litigation as a potential means to realize 
large-scale policy goals and hold accountable perpetrators of egregious abuses, whether or 
not such litigation results in an enforceable judgment.”). 
 133 Chimène I. Keitner, Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases, 60 HASTINGS 
L.J. 61, 64 (2008) (“ATS cases against corporate defendants involve high stakes on both 
sides. For victims, these cases offer an unusual chance to receive monetary compensation 
for human rights violations, in addition to providing symbolic vindication and deterring 
corporate involvement in internationally wrongful conduct.”). 
 134 Stephens, supra note 132, at 13 (“[I]n some public interest cases, ‘the subject 
matter of the lawsuit is not a dispute between private individuals about private rights, 
but a grievance about the operation of public policy.’”).  
 135 Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 
2349 (1991). 
 136 Id. at 2347–48 (“[T]ransnational public law litigation seeks to vindicate public 
rights and values through judicial remedies. In both settings, parties bring ‘public 
actions,’ asking courts to declare and explicate public norms, often with the goal of 
provoking institutional reform.”). 
 137 Stephens, supra note 132, at 14 (“[C]ivil litigation may lead to a full investigation 
of the facts of an incident, identify the persons responsible, produce a public judgment of 
that responsibility, and generate compensation for those harmed and punitive damages as 
a sanction for the accused.”). 
Do Not Delete 3/18/2014 8:16 PM 
2014] Corporate Social Responsibility in a Remedy-Seeking Society 449 
a simple torts case into a case with a larger message and 
meaning.138 Judgments can operate to negotiate issues in larger 
public ideological conflicts.139 And the threats of liability can 
operate to induce settlement—on both monetary and 
action-based terms. 
Corporations are motivated to negotiate with corporate social 
responsibility advocates when there is a perceived risk to the 
corporate brand or reputation.140 The interest groups are savvy at 
focusing on what the corporations have to lose.141 Those 
negotiations take on a much more serious character when the 
advocates for social responsibility can legitimately threaten a 
lawsuit with a real risk of liability if the corporation does not 
change its behavior or otherwise settle with the advocacy 
group.142 The corporations are willing to bargain as a 
self-protection measure, trying to minimize the harm that could 
be inflicted upon them if they do not bargain with the interest 
group.143 
 
 138 See, e.g., Donald E. Childress III, The Alien Tort Statute, Federalism, and the Next 
Wave of Transnational Litigation, 100 GEO. L.J. 709, 725 (2012) (stating that “it seems 
that the real value of an ATS case is that it transforms a tort case into a human-rights 
case,” although concluding it is not clear how effective this strategy has been for activist 
plaintiffs).  
 139 Koh, supra note 135, at 2349 (“Even a judgment that the plaintiff cannot enforce 
against the defendant in the rendering forum empowers the plaintiff by creating a 
bargaining chip for use in other political fora.”). 
 140 Lisa M. Fairfax, Easier Said Than Done? A Corporate Law Theory for Actualizing 
Social Responsibility Rhetoric, 59 FLA. L. REV. 771, 805–06 (2007) (“Recent literature 
regarding corporate brands reveals that corporations . . . spend considerable effort 
creating and protecting the corporate identity through the use of such techniques as 
brands and slogans.”). 
 141 G. RICHARD SHELL, BARGAINING FOR ADVANTAGE: NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES FOR 
REASONABLE PEOPLE 98 (2006) (discussing the strength of leverage when there is a 
concrete risk of loss). 
 142 Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial 
Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 418–19 (1973) [hereinafter Posner, Economic 
Approach to Legal Procedure] (discussing subjective probability of prevailing and stakes 
as elements in settlement calculus). 
 143 Fairfax, supra note 140, at 806–07. Fairfax explains that, “[r]eputation represents 
a key component of corporate identity, and corporations aim to build a reputation of 
trustworthiness . . . . The crux of recent literature is that once a corporation constructs an 
identity, people within the corporation feel a responsibility to engage in actions that 
protect and preserve that identity, thus fostering a quality reputation.” Id. (citing, inter 
alia, KEVIN LANE KELLER, STRATEGIC BRAND MANAGEMENT: BUILDING, MEASURING, AND 
MANAGING BRAND EQUITY 546 (2d ed. 2003) (discussing the “Science of Branding”)); see 
also George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1, 24–25 (1984) (“[T]he loss of the case may damage the defendant’s public 
reputation . . . . In situations of this nature, the dollar judgment sought by the plaintiff 
may reflect only a small portion of the defendant’s total loss if the plaintiff wins.”); Shaun 
Mulreed, Comment, Private Securities Litigation Reform Failure: How Scienter Has 
Prevented the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 from Achieving Its Goals, 
42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 779, 781 n.2 (2005) (“In considering whether to settle or litigate, a 
corporation must weigh both the costs of settlement and potential brand injury against 
expected results at trial.”). 
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When faced with a lawsuit or the threat of a viable liability 
claim, it is entirely possible that the judgment value is far 
exceeded by the external effects of the litigation on the 
corporation and the corporation’s own interests in preserving its 
brand, image, reputation, customer base, investor interest, and 
the like. Thus, corporations will often even settle when they 
could win the substantive lawsuit but do not wish to incur the 
incidental expense of the litigation and collateral damage along 
the way. Moreover, if there is an ambiguous or uncertain risk, 
which may very well be the case in newly developing liability 
regimes, then the corporation may want to be risk averse—again 
motivating settlement. 
Interest groups will change course or divert their strategy 
based on where their investment can return the greatest result. 
The relative availability of liability mechanisms will have an 
effect on resource allocation. Interest groups will invest in 
litigation so long as the litigation (or cause of action) is viable. If 
attractive causes of action exist, we can expect that an 
expansionist interest group will invest more in litigation and less 
in other avenues of attack. If courts are receptive to innovative 
liability ideas, then too we should expect interest groups to invest 
in developing a favorable liability doctrine complete with 
bankrolling litigation efforts for the purpose of developing 
precedent and dicta that constantly adds growing value to the 
new scheme. 
Because the viable cause of action is a very valuable and 
powerful tool, we should expect that such groups will invest in 
the development and expansion of liability doctrines that have a 
high likelihood of becoming recognized as providing for legitimate 
new claims. According to studies on settlement dynamics, there 
is a dramatic shift in leverage between litigation competitors as 
soon as a doctrine develops to the point that claims begin to 
survive motions to dismiss.144 Soon thereafter the incentives for 
corporate defendants to settle in corporate social 
responsibility-driven litigation will increase.145 Consequently, 
even an investment in a liability regime that only takes it just 
 
 144 Hillary A. Sale, Judges Who Settle, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 377, 386 (2011) (“Avoiding 
damages and reputational harm and gaining preclusion all provide an incentive to 
settle . . . . Even if the defendants believe that the allegations lack merit, when the 
plaintiffs’ claims survive a motion to dismiss, the risk of a trial and the possibility of a bad 
outcome increase.”). 
 145 Id.; see also A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class 
Actions with Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925, 952–53 (1999) 
(“If the plaintiffs can withstand a motion to dismiss, defendants generally will find 
settlement cheaper than litigation . . . . Any case plausible on the pleadings will have a 
positive settlement value if only to avoid the costs of discovery and attorneys’ fees . . . .”). 
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that far—to the point that the once novel theory is now accepted, 
viable, and capable of surviving a motion to dismiss or summary 
judgment—may be a very valuable use of an interest group’s 
budget. Sometimes, the change in the status of the parties and 
their positioning in negotiations are far more important than the 
relative merits of the claims. 
As the next Part will explain, the Alien Tort Statute is an 
example of such an interest-group motivated development of a 
liability doctrine. Lawsuits and their potential for monetary 
awards were attractive to ATS expansionists, but they were not 
the most advantageous outcome of the seeming acceptance of 
corporate liability under the ATS. The doctrine that developed 
provided leverage in negotiations with corporations and an 
invigorated position when demanding behavioral change from 
the corporation.146 The mere ability of corporate social 
responsibility-minded plaintiffs to survive a motion to dismiss in 
ATS suits against corporate defendants tipped the scales in a 
manner that substantially increased the bargaining power of the 
corporate social responsibility advocates. When causes of action 
cannot be developed or where they are taken off the table—such 
as with a Supreme Court case like Kiobel147 that essentially now 
removes most of the ATS cases from the list of viable litigation 
routes for gaining leverage against multinational corporations for 
their activities outside the United States—we should expect such 
interest groups to shift their resources to alternative points of 
attack. 
Despite the consequences of Kiobel narrowing to near nil the 
effective and available ATS claims designed to alter corporate 
behavior, the history of the ATS provides a useful study for (1) 
examining the broad concept of rent-seeking beyond legislation; 
(2) analyzing the effects of investment in lawmaking outcomes 
including liability doctrines; and (3) demonstrating that 
corporate social responsibility advocacy groups act like other 
interest groups when seeking their preferred outcomes. 
Investments in liability doctrines can be helpful in obtaining 
valuable leverage for use in trying to change corporate behavior, 
as one will see in the example that follows in the next Part. The 
ATS corporate liability regime was designed, constructed, and 
the product of investment by coalitions of interest groups aligned 
by expansive corporate social responsibility preferences. The ATS 
 
 146 Beth Van Schaack, With All Deliberate Speed: Civil Human Rights Litigation as a 
Tool for Social Change, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2305, 2329 (2004) (“As jurisprudence under the 
ATCA has become more robust, the genuine threat of legal entitlement increasingly 
presents the necessary predicate for settlement negotiations.”). 
 147  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
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worked its way into becoming a major mechanization for using 
litigation to affect changes in corporate conduct. 
III. THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE AS A CASE STUDY IN CORPORATE 
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY ADVOCATE-INVESTMENT IN THE 
CREATION OF LIABILITY DOCTRINES 
To illustrate some of this Article’s contentions regarding 
interest group investment in corporate social responsibility law, I 
will use the investments made in developing a liability regime for 
multinational corporate operations through the vehicle of the 
Alien Tort Statute (ATS) as a case study.148 The ATS grants the 
federal district courts subject-matter jurisdiction over “any civil 
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the 
law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”149 
The ATS liability revolution emerged around 1980, before 
which almost no litigation had been brought under that 
statute.150 After being “discovered,” the Alien Tort Statute 
became one of the most important and controversial mechanisms 
by which federal courts wrestled with and sometimes entertained 
international law and human rights issues. Across the years, 
most of the cases alleged that nation-states, state actors, and 
even private individuals or corporations had actually committed, 
or in complicity or conspiracy had been responsible for, violations 
of international law. 
 
 148 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). For more complete discussions of the Alien Tort Statute, 
its history, and its implications for law and policy, several other works by this Author 
may be instructive. See generally Kochan, Mechanization, supra note 27; Donald J. 
Kochan, Sovereignty and the American Courts at the Cocktail Party of International Law: 
The Dangers of Domestic Judicial Invocations of Foreign and International Law, 29 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 507 (2006); Donald J. Kochan, Boyakasha, Fist to Fist: Respect and 
the Philosophical Link with Reciprocity in International Law and Human Rights, 38 GEO. 
WASH. INT’L. L. REV. 349 (2006); Donald J. Kochan, No Longer Little Known But Now a 
Door Ajar: An Overview of the Evolving and Dangerous Role of the Alien Tort Statute in 
Human Rights and International Law Jurisprudence, 8 CHAPMAN L. REV. 103 (2005) 
[hereinafter Kochan, No Longer Little Known]; Kochan, Political Economy, supra note 
118; Donald J. Kochan, Note, Constitutional Structure as a Limitation on the Scope of the 
“Law of Nations” in the Alien Tort Claims Act, 31 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 153 (1998) 
[hereinafter Kochan, Constitutional Structure]; see also Donald J. Kochan, After Burma: 
Like the Massachusetts Law, the Alien Tort Claims Act Allows Improper Interference in 
U.S. Foreign Policy, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 21, 2000, at 54. 
 149 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). For annotation based histories of ATS litigation, see 
Russell G. Donaldson, Annotation, Construction and Application of Alien Tort Statute (28 
U.S.C.A. § 1350), Providing for Federal Jurisdiction Over Alien’s Action for Tort 
Committed in Violation of Law of Nations or Treaty of the United States, 116 A.L.R. FED. 
387 (2005); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & EDWARD H. COOPER, 14A 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §  3661.1 (Pocket Part 2005). 
 150 Judge Friendly has described the Act as an “old but little used section [that] is a 
kind of legal Lohengrin; although it has been with us since the first Judiciary Act, no one 
seems to know whence it came.” IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) 
(citation omitted) (holding fraud not a violation of international law). 
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While ATS corporate social responsibility-based liability and 
the reform-through-litigation strategy that led to its creation 
were largely put to a stop when the U.S. Supreme Court decided 
the 2013 case of Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,151 the 
evolution of the ATS—including the investment in the 
development of the liability regime by broad-minded corporate 
social responsibility advocates and the leverage that those 
advocates obtained during the years while the ATS seemed a 
viable threat to corporations—is nonetheless instructive 
regarding how investments in liability regimes operate 
effectively for interest groups. 
A quotation from a 2003 article in the Financial Times helps 
illustrate the suitability of choosing the ATS as a case study for 
an examination of the mechanics of corporate social 
responsibility-based interest groups: “US plaintiffs’ lawyers have 
revived a dormant 18th-century law and made it their chief 
weapon in a 21st-century battle over corporate responsibility in 
an age of globalisation.”152 That was undoubtedly true.153 From 
1980 to 2013, the scope of ATS litigation grew extensively in 
large part due to investments made in its creation. As it grew, 
there was an ever-increasing risk that major liabilities could 
attach for corporate business decisions and behaviors 
accompanied by the expansion of enforceable duties corporations 
owed to diverse groups of stakeholders worldwide.154 As one 
author put it, the doctrine evolved “[i]n the best traditions of 
American legal creativity,”155 as spurred by corporate social 
 
 151 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).  
 152 Patti Waldmeir, An Abuse of Power: US Courts Should Not Punish Companies for 
Human Rights Violations Committed Overseas, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2003, at 12. 
 153 Williams, supra note 1, at 724–66 (discussing problems and possibilities of using 
the ATS to achieve corporate social responsibility). 
 154 John B. Bellinger, III, The U.S. Can’t Be the World’s Court, WALL ST. J., May 27, 
2009, at A19 (op-ed by attorney in Washington, D.C. and former legal advisor to the U.S. 
Department of State) (“We may be on the verge of a new wave of legal actions against 
U.S. and foreign corporations in American courts . . . . Litigation under the Alien Tort 
Statute may force companies to modify their international activities in some cases, 
although it rarely produces monetary awards for plaintiffs.”). 
 155 Waldmeir, supra note 152, at 12. As analysts watched the ATS evolution, 
commentary was rich. For example, in commenting on the then-ongoing ATS suit against 
Unocal, The Economist in its April 24, 1999 issue described the potential implications of 
this new trend in tort litigation: “The next big test will be  whether the Alien Tort Claims 
Act can be used against companies as well as individuals.” Human-Rights Trials: To Sue 
a Dictator, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 24, 1999, at 26. And, the authors prognosticated that if 
companies began losing under the ATS, it could “provide a major headache for many 
American companies operating abroad.” Id. When discussing an award against Serbian 
leader Karadzic, an August 2000 Washington Post editorial called the new line of ATS 
human rights’ cases “troubling” as “proceed[ing] under an ill-conceived but now well-
accepted reading of a 1789 law that . . . is a modern graft on a largely moribund statute; 
international human rights law did not exist in the 18th century.” Lawsuits and Foreign 
Policy, WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 2000, at A20. In November 2002, it was opined in the 
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responsibility advocates generally along with human rights 
groups, labor organizations, the plaintiffs’ bar as a strong 
supporter with its own financial interests,156 and others aligned 
with interests in developing new liability schemes. 
Signs of the synergies between the causes favoring 
expanding ATS liability doctrines and those seeking greater 
corporate social responsibility were readily apparent as the law 
progressed to accept an ever-growing role for the ATS. One labor 
activist explained that the ATS was viewed within these groups 
as a “vital tool for preventing corporations from violating 
fundamental human rights.”157 A Corporate Legal Times headline 
in 2002 put the reputational leverage issue front and center, 
reading “No Longer Satisfied With Destroying the Reputations of 
Corporations That Get Entangled in Human Rights Abuses 
Overseas, Activist Groups are Seeking Retribution in U.S. 
Courts.”158 One scholar opined that the ATS “cases should be 
regarded as one element in a wide spectrum of attempts to tame 
corporate behavior by inventing new global regulatory 
regimes.”159 There was active investment by corporate social 
responsibility-aligned advocacy groups in the creation of a legal 
 
Financial Times that the ATS jurisprudential trend presented a “danger that the US 
judicial system will become the world’s civil court of first resort . . . .” Thomas Niles, The 
Very Long Arm of American Law, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2002, at 15. In yet another article in 
2004, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce was quoted as characterizing the emerging ATS 
suits as “‘global forum shopping,’ in which foreigners resort to U.S. courts, with their 
favorable class action and discovery rules, to litigate over alleged human rights abuses 
overseas by U.S. corporations. ‘The U.S. is increasingly becoming the jurisdiction of choice 
for opportunistic foreign plaintiffs,’ says Chamber President Thomas Donohue.” Tony 
Mauro, Justices Debate Alien Tort Law, LEGAL TIMES, April 5, 2004, at 8. 
 156 Van Schaack, supra note 146, at 2314 (“As ATCA jurisprudence became more 
established and courts confirmed that corporations could be sued for human rights 
abuses, the statute was ‘discovered’ by plaintiff-side lawyers . . . .”). Cf. Richard A. 
Epstein, The Political Economy of Product Liability Reform, 78 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & 
PROC.) 311, 313 (1988). As Epstein has observed, when lawyers are in the mix in tort 
suits, both the plaintiffs’ and defendants’ bar will perpetuate expanded tort liabilities:  
Obviously, the plaintiff’s bar has a vital interest in preserving that system of 
laws which maximizes its own welfare. Less obviously, perhaps, the 
defendant’s bar has closely parallel interests. No defendant lawyer has ever 
made substantial sums of money by being able to win a summary judgment 
(i.e., judgment without the need for trial) for its clients. 
Id. 
 157 TERRY COLLINGSWORTH, INT’L LABOR RIGHTS FUND, THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT 
– A VITAL TOOL FOR PREVENTING CORPORATIONS FROM VIOLATING FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
(2003), available at http://lrights.igc.org/publications/ATCA.pdf. 
 158 See Robert Vosper, Conduct Unbecoming; No Longer Satisfied With Destroying the 
Reputations of Corporations That Get Entangled in Human Rights Abuses Overseas, 
Activist Groups are Seeking Retribution in U.S. Courts, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, October 
2002, at 35. 
 159 Ronen Shamir, Between Self-Regulation and the Alien Tort Claims Act: On the 
Contested Concept of Corporate Social Responsibility, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 635, 643 
(2004). 
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liability regime that could be utilized to achieve not just 
judgments but also substantial leverage through an alteration of 
the relative legal rights between two competitors—corporations 
seeking profit-maximization for their shareholders on the one 
hand and stakeholders on the other side wanting instead for 
corporate expenditures to be made to advance social interests 
and desiring corporate profits to be shared with those claiming 
an entitlement to remedies for some broad concept of harm 
allegedly visited upon them by corporate behavior. 
The ATS provided a means by which the soft ideals of human 
rights and other international law activists could be transformed 
into hard legal requirements.160 As such, they and other 
corporate social responsibility advocates and like-minded 
activists invested in the development of ATS litigation.161 Their 
investments in early litigation brought returns as broader and 
broader precedents developed and liability under the ATS started 
to become more realistic and substantial, or at least was 
perceived as such. 
The remainder of this Part will provide further background 
on the ATS and explain the ATS evolution as a way of describing 
the process of interest group investment in new liability 
doctrines. That analysis will include a description of the 
economic benefits associated with purchasing, in effect, a stick 
from the law’s liability-creating tort function to gain an 
advantaged position that can be used to beat down a corporation 
that, before the creation of the new doctrines, was in a more 
favorable legal bargaining position with fewer recognized legal 
duties. 
In the case of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala in 1980, the ATS 
emerged from non-use and the evolution of ATS litigation 
began.162 There, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
held that suits based on customary international law for human 
rights abuses could be pursued under the ATS.163 This opened 
the door for several cases against numerous state actors from 
rather oppressive regimes. It was clear that those involved in 
early ATS litigation were in fact investing in the development of 
 
 160 Van Schaack, supra note 146, at 2335 (discussing using the ATS to “transform the 
abstract and at times hortatory rights in the various international declarations, covenants 
and treaties into enforceable legal claims” with more concrete status).  
 161 Id. at 2313 (“The first generation of individual ATCA-style actions was initiated 
by lawyers affiliated with nonprofit human rights organizations, or lawyers working pro 
bono, who were inspired by the tradition of using legal tools to advance morality-driven 
goals.”). 
 162 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 163 Id. 
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an expansive doctrine, understanding that the effective 
development of a new liability scheme must take baby steps,164 
establishing precedent that gradually expands.165 Professor Beth 
Stephens has described the civil human rights litigation model 
witnessed in the ATS cases as involving a strategy of precedent 
creation and expansion: 
  Civil litigation in the United States . . . has long been used as a 
means of promoting social reform . . . . In the United States, we are 
generally comfortable with the concept that lawsuits seek remedies 
designed with an eye to the future . . . .  
. . . . 
  U.S. commentators have explained at length the benefits that civil 
litigation offers to the victim, to the human rights movement, and to 
society—even litigation that does not result in actual payment of the 
damages awarded. Where the legal theories are novel or untested, a 
civil lawsuit may seek first to obtain a judicial recognition of the rule 
of law, a precedent that can then be used to influence future policies 
and as a basis for future litigation.166 
Similarly, Professor Harold Koh has discussed the strategic 
importance of transnational public law litigation beyond 
particular cases and extending to the creation of precedent and 
other “prospective aim[s] as well.”167 These aims include “to 
provoke judicial articulation of a norm of transnational law, with 
an eye toward using that declaration to promote a political 
settlement in which both governmental and nongovernmental 
entities will participate.”168 Koh has further emphasized, after 
discussing the early ATS cases, that “transnational public law 
litigation is characterized by . . . the litigants’ strategic 
awareness of the transportability of those norms to other 
domestic and international fora for use in judicial interpretation 
or political bargaining . . . .”169 While relief in a particular case is 
not irrelevant, the prospective benefits from “building” law for 
use in, and “transporting” precedent to, future cases and as 
 
 164 Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 
2366 (1991) (discussing the first major ATS case Filartiga and explaining that in that 
case “transnational public law litigants finally found their Brown v. Board of Education”);  
 165 See, e.g., Vincy Fon, Francesco Parisi & Ben Depoorter, Litigation, Judicial Path-
Dependence, and Legal Change, 20 EUR. J. L. & ECON. 43, 44 (2005) (“The model of path 
dependence in the law suggests the rate of recognition of legal claims brought by plaintiffs 
in past cases affects the state of the law in the future.”). 
 166 Stephens, supra note 132, at 13–14 (emphasis added). 
 167 Koh, supra note 135, at 2349. 
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. at 2371. 
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leverage in bargaining often seemed to be a fundamental 
objective in the ATS cases.170 
Many of the earliest ATS cases against state actor 
defendants resulted in default judgments in favor of the 
plaintiffs. With little party opposition and often gruesome 
allegations, receptive courts began issuing judgments 
accompanied by broadly worded interpretations of the scope of 
the ATS. These cases seemingly served only a symbolic function 
with limited effect as judgments were seldom collected.171 In 
essence, these awards could be characterized as a “judgments as 
social commentary” approach.172 
But it was also a well-orchestrated campaign to build up the 
ATS early on with easy cases followed by later application to new 
situations and new defendants (with deeper pockets and who 
were more likely to offer something of value to the plaintiffs to 
see the litigation go away).173 As explained above, this playbook 
is well known in the evolution of tort law and manifest in public 
international law litigation as well. 
These cases were necessary to create a foundation for a 
bigger target down the road—corporations. Many of the corporate 
social responsibility-associated interest groups suing 
corporations toward the end of the ATS evolution were on the 
ground from the start, remedy-seeking for alleged harms 
occurring around the world and looking for someone to hold 
responsible. 
Moreover, it is important to note that while the public law 
litigators were building precedent, there were few forces working 
against them. In the early years, there was no countervailing 
interest-group force balancing the zealous expansionist group 
 
 170 Keitner, supra note 133, at 64 (“[C]orporate ATS litigation has become a 
battleground in broader struggles over the role of tort litigation in regulating corporate 
behavior . . . .”). 
 171 Lauren A. Dellinger, Corporate Social Responsibility: A Multifaceted Tool to Avoid 
Alien Tort Claims Act Litigation While Simultaneously Building a Better Business 
Reputation, 40 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 55, 91 (2009) (ATS “litigation has largely been 
unsuccessful in the sense that no solid judgments against these corporations have been 
entered. . . . In the past, individuals have used the ATS merely to obtain a sense of justice, 
realizing that the monetary award may never come.”).  
 172 A Washington Post editorial raised concerns about the ATS as it was expanding, 
especially after seeing judgments pursued solely for symbolic effect. That editorial 
cautioned that “[y]ou don’t have to be indifferent to human rights abuses to have 
misgivings about this reading [of the ATS], because it creates troubling problems for 
democratic government and permits the courts to interfere excessively in the conduct of 
foreign policy.” Old Law, New Questions, WASH. POST, July 20, 2004, at A16. 
 173 Van Schaack, supra note 146, at 2313 (“At the outset, these legal pioneers sought 
to establish the ATCA as a tool for the enforcement of human rights norms and to gain 
judicial elaboration of the scope of those norms.”). 
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investment in ATS litigation. There was no check on the forward 
progress of the doctrinal evolution. There was, as explained 
above, little opposition in the lawsuits themselves and few 
interest groups outside the litigation saw any danger to the 
doctrinal progress.174 Corporations did not see the coming threat 
and did not intervene in the ATS development.175 Indeed, even 
the academy was lopsided in favor of the expansion.176 Academics 
were in large part the intellectual driving force behind the 
beginnings of the ATS revolution and, of those that wrote about 
the ATS at all, the majority of scholars favored its expansion.177 
It was not until the late 1990s that any scholarly works focused 
on refuting the merits and wisdom of the ATS evolution in any 
substantial and critical manner.178 
The development of the new liability doctrines under the 
ATS was in the finest traditions of rent-seeking too. Activists 
were seeking to create a law that would place them in a position 
of dominance over the legal rights of others, ultimately allowing 
them to obtain outcomes at a lower cost than if they were 
required to bargain privately for such a reallocation of duties and 
obligations. 
Another major step in the ATS evolution occurred in the 
1995 Kadic v. Karadžic case, in which the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit held that quasi-public and even private 
actors might be bound by customary international law for certain 
egregious violations and could be sued under the ATS.179 This 
 
 174 See Kochan, No Longer Little Known, supra note 148, at 108 n.20 (discussing the 
lack of corporate interest, for example, even in the late 1990s). 
 175 Id. at 107–08. 
 176 See HAROLD HONGJU KOH, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 
35 (2008) (noting that Filartiga “triggered a wave of academic scholarship and more than 
a quarter-century of human rights litigation in U.S. courts”); see also David Fontana, The 
Rise and Fall of Comparative Constitutional Law in the Postwar Era, 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 
1, 27–30 (2011) (“The law professors who revitalized international law during this time [in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s before and after Filartiga] came from a profession more 
and more interested in international law—in particular as a source for American federal 
litigation.”). 
 177 See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Judicial Imperialism, WALL ST. J., June 17, 2003, at A16 
(discussing ATS cases as part of the effort toward “the enactment of world-wide law by an 
unholy alliance of imperialistic judges and a leftish cadre of international law 
professors”); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 749–50 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“The notion that a law of nations, redefined to mean the consensus of states on any 
subject, can be used by a private citizen to control a sovereign’s treatment of its own 
citizens within its own territory is a 20th-century invention of internationalist law 
professors and human-rights advocates.”) (emphasis in original).  
 178 My 1998 student note was one of the very first articles providing any substantial 
and concentrated critique of the ATS specifically. See Kochan, Constitutional Structure, 
supra note 148. 
 179 Kadic v. Karadžic, 70 F.3d 232, 239–44 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005 
(1996). 
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was the next return on the ATS-promoters’ investment, 
expanding the scope of defendants just a little more and creating 
the necessary precedential prelude to finding corporate liability 
under the ATS. And that is precisely what came next.  
ATS liability expanded next in the late-1990s with successes 
in bringing suits (and surviving motions to dismiss) against 
corporate defendants. The 1997 Doe I v. Unocal case, where the 
corporate-defendant ATS suit had its first major validation, was 
trailblazing.180 A federal district court held that Unocal, a private 
corporation, was subject to ATS jurisdiction for alleged human 
rights abuses abroad.181 After that 1997 decision, it was open 
season for the use of the ATS against corporations to try to 
advance the agendas of a variety of corporate social 
responsibility-minded interest groups. 
Between 1997 and 2013, scores of lawsuits were filed against 
corporations under the ATS.182 The theories also broadened  
over time, sometimes alleging corporate liability on 
aiding-and-abetting or vicarious liability theories in addition to 
some claiming that international law was broad enough to 
impose direct liability for corporate actions independent of the 
acts of the ruling regimes where they operate.183 
Activists had faced somewhat incomplete and unsatisfactory 
victories against nation states or foreign leaders in early ATS 
litigation. Barriers to “success” for plaintiffs in the early ATS 
suits included sovereign immunity for state actors, forum non 
conveniens dismissals, cases dismissed on political question or 
act of state doctrine defenses, and problems obtaining personal 
jurisdiction over some state actor defendants, along with other 
prudential rules that insulated many nations or state actors from 
ATS review. On top of these barriers, even when plaintiffs were 
successful in proceeding to trial against a state actor ATS 
defendant, these parties were often judgment proof or their 
assets were inaccessible for collection. 
 
 180 Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 963 F.Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997). 
 181 Id. at 892, 898 (upholding subject matter jurisdiction under ATS based on 
allegations that an American oil company, acting in concert with the Burmese 
government, committed various civil and human rights abuses), aff’d in part & rev’d in 
part, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), and rehearing en banc granted, opinion vacated by Doe 
v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 182 For a summary of major pre-Kiobel ATS cases, see Lee G. Dunst, Human Rights 
Overseas: Courts Have Enforced Strict Gatekeeping Function in Dismissing Suits Under 
the Alien Tort Claims Act, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 26, 2009, at S6. See also generally MICHAEL 
KOEBELE, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY UNDER THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE (2009); RALPH G. 
STEINHARDT & ANTHONY D’AMATO, THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT: AN ANALYTICAL 
ANTHOLOGY (1999). 
 183 See generally KOEBELE, supra note 182. 
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Targeting corporations in ATS suits overcame several 
problems for plaintiffs. Corporate ATS suits were in part a 
response to the dissatisfaction regarding the inability to recover 
either monetary judgments or true justice against state actors in 
these early cases.184 Corporations do not enjoy sovereign 
immunity and have a more difficult time using the other shields 
mentioned above. Thus, in many cases, jurisdictional obstacles to 
suit, while keeping foreign nations and leaders out of the 
defendant’s chair, could be avoided when suing a corporation. 
The next milestone in the ATS evolution came with the 2004 
decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.185 That case marked the 
first time that the U.S. Supreme Court had discussed the ATS, 
although even in Sosa the Court offered only minimal guidance 
as to its scope.186 The Sosa decision did little to disrupt the 
upward liability trend in the ATS cases and did not foreclose 
corporate ATS suits.187 
The ATS suits were at first novel and extraordinary. By 
2009, however, at least one writer was arguing that “[t]hese 
lawsuits have become so routine . . . they’ve barely caused a 
ripple in the news cycle.”188 Although perhaps overstated, 
another author even observed in 2009 that ATS suits had  
become “commonplace for companies with international 
operations . . . .”189 ATS suits were clearly aimed at inducing 
changes in corporate behavior, and the number of cases steadily 
rose as the corporate ATS suit became perceived as an 
increasingly legitimate means of grievance, a beneficial means of 
remedy-seeking, and an acceptable mechanism for holding 
corporations to a higher standard of care with a broader base of 
constituent stakeholder interests owed some duties by those 
corporations.190 
 
 184 Nathan Koppel, Arcane Law Brings Conflicts From Overseas to U.S. Courts, WALL 
ST. J., Aug. 27, 2009, at A11 (“Thomas Niles, a former U.S. ambassador to Canada and 
Greece who is now the vice chairman of the United States Council for International 
Business, a pro-business group, says corporations are being used unfairly as a surrogate 
for foreign governments in these cases. ‘You can’t sue the government of Nigeria or South 
Africa because of sovereign immunity, so who are you going to sue? Companies, and they 
are sued essentially for being’ in countries where human-rights violations occur.”). 
 185 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
 186 See generally Kochan, No Longer Little Known, supra note 148. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Steven Dudley, The Trials and Errors of Tort Cases: Lawsuits Against 
Multinationals for Abuses Abroad may be Losing Steam, MIAMI HERALD, June 15, 2009, at 
G12 (recognizing there were “more than 30 [corporate ATS] suits around the country” at 
the time of his article). 
 189 See Dunst, supra note 182, at S6. 
 190 Koppel, supra note 184, at A11. As a Wall Street Journal reporter explained, 
“Victims of human-rights abuses around the world increasingly are seeking justice 
American style – by filing lawsuits against deep-pocketed defendants. Both sides agree on 
Do Not Delete 3/18/2014 8:16 PM 
2014] Corporate Social Responsibility in a Remedy-Seeking Society 461 
As the ATS cases had progressed, the ATS activists pushed 
increasingly expansive theories of the ATS’s scope, often with 
success. The first wave of ATS litigation came in the 1980s with 
cases that were largely based on sympathetic facts and 
allegations of unacceptable atrocities with allegations of 
relatively direct causation by ruthless and despicable defendants. 
This made these “easy” cases to decide and made the opinions in 
the cases susceptible to relatively far-reaching statements 
regarding the purpose and reach of the ATS. Precedent under the 
ATS was developing, and both precedent and dicta could always 
be manipulated in the next case to slowly expand the accepted 
and recognized reach of the ATS and increase the pool of 
defendants. Every expansion of the liability doctrine was a 
stepping-stone to yet another stage of expansion. 
Corporations eventually recognized the threat, as evidenced 
by the liability-management techniques engaged in by ATS 
defense attorneys and public relations managers in the public 
square in the late 2000s. Several of these reputation managers 
and liability limiters published articles in the news media 
regarding the cost of ATS litigation to corporations and the 
litigation risks involved.191 Some of these articles and op-eds read 
with the tone of client development letters, but they are 
nonetheless an instructive perspective from the front lines 
reflecting at least the perceived threat. These same defense 
attorneys later trumpeted the Kiobel decision as a glorious end to 
the dangerous ATS litigation scheme against corporations.192 
Activist litigators had “seized the opportunity” to begin 
litigating against corporations under the ATS because 
corporations were much more attractive targets than early ATS 
defendants.193 There was also a higher probability of settling 
 
one thing: Courts increasingly are willing to consider alien-tort suits and to force 
companies to answer for their behavior overseas.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 191 For a sampling of these articles, see J. Russell Jackson, Alien Tort Claims Act 
Cases Keep Coming: Lawsuits by Plaintiffs From All Over the World Present Major Risks 
for Companies Doing Business Abroad, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 14, 2009, at 28 (author “a partner 
in the mass torts group at New York’s Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, which 
represents defendants in Alien Tort Claims Act cases”); Jordan Cowman, The Alien Tort 
Statute – Corporate Social Responsibility Takes On a New Meaning, MONDAQ, Aug. 11, 
2009 (author  a partner in the Dallas office of Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP); 
Jonathan Drimmer & Jennifer Millerwise Dyck, Human Rights Threat Matrix: Corporate 
Responsibility Through a Legal Lens, PR NEWS, Apr. 20, 2009, at 7 (authors are a partner 
of Steptoe and Johnson L.L.P, and a VP of APCO Worldwide, respectively). 
 192 See, e.g., Andrew Pincus, Is the Alien Tort a Zombie Doctrine? Andrew Pincus 
Responds, LITIGATION DAILY, April 29, 2013, http://www.americanlawyer.com/ 
digestTAL.jsp?id=1202597980026&Is_the_Alien_Tort_a_Zombie_Doctrine_Andrew_Pincu
s_Responds (a perspective of the ATS evolution from beginning to end by one of the 
lawyers for corporate defendants). 
 193 Kirschner explains: 
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cases with positive results for the plaintiffs, judged by a variety 
of metrics (including bargaining for changed behaviors) in 
addition to monetary relief.194 
True to corporate social responsibility form, many ATS suits 
seek more than monetary damages in their demands for relief.195 
For example, “plaintiffs in the corporate cases have increasingly 
sought judicial directives governing [Multinational Corporations’] 
foreign investment policies, relations with their host 
governments, offshore production arrangements, project security 
measures, environmental policies, and labor relations.”196 It is 
not surprising then that these same plaintiffs seek more than 
money in settlement negotiations including reforms in corporate 
behaviors.197 
While there is an emphasis in some public civil litigation for 
obtaining damages for the particular plaintiff in the case, most 
often these cases are motivated by something more. In 
transnational tort litigation, for example, Koh explains that, 
“although transnational public law plaintiffs routinely request 
retrospective damages or even prospective injunctive relief, their 
broader strategic goals are often served by a declaratory or 
default judgment announcing that a transnational norm has 
been violated.”198 It is the development of precedent that has 
broader utility in terms of its advancement of a cause and a 
promoter’s position in negotiations with adversaries of the cause. 
Redressing the plaintiff’s injury is often a secondary goal in 
corporate social responsibility advocacy-generated litigation.199 
This is not universally true for all involved—some plaintiffs’ 
 
  Corporations provide easier targets for ATS claims than individuals or 
repressive regimes, and litigators seized the opportunity. The 2001 Doe v. 
Unocal case offered to charge them with complicity in human rights abuses. 
Suits against corporations have reached actions taken by many individuals 
that only collectively amount to illegalities. Sovereign immunity has not 
protected corporations as it has governments. Most large corporations have 
maintained permanent presences within the United States, making it possible 
to establish personal jurisdiction over them. Corporations also have had more 
substantial recoverable assets and stronger incentives to settle claims to avoid 
negative publicity than other defendants. 
Jodie A. Kirshner, Why Is the U.S. Abdicating the Policing of Multinational Corporations 
to Europe?: Extraterritoriality, Sovereignty, and the Alien Tort Statute, 30 BERKLEY J. 
INT’L L. 259, 272–73 (2012). 
 194 Id. 
 195 Van Schaack, supra note 146, at 2328. 
 196 Id. 
 197 Id. 
 198 Koh, supra note 135, at 2349. 
 199 See, e.g., Van Schaack, supra note 146, at 2313 (speaking of the ATS cases and 
stating that “[a]lthough ostensibly tort disputes seeking retrospective relief, obtaining an 
executable judgment was often a secondary goal of this litigation.”).  
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lawyers are in it for a payday and want to maximize the 
monetary judgment to maximize their contingency fee and their 
demands in corporate social responsibility liability litigation have 
complicated settlements aimed at achieving more grand 
reform-based outcomes.200 Nonetheless, when a reform agenda 
dominates the litigation strategy, one can expect that the 
litigation will be aimed at obtaining some concessions from a 
corporation that could not have been extracted absent the 
existence of the liability regime. 
ATS advocates began to utilize the tool created by their 
investment in the creation of new law, leveraging the threat of 
ATS liability to induce corporations to agree to change conduct or 
pay monetary settlements. Without the ATS, the advocates’ legal 
position was weaker and they would have been required to “pay” 
the corporations to change. Stated another way, without the 
duties even just potentially imposed by the ATS, the corporations 
could stand on their then-existing legal position where a payment 
to the corporate social interest group would feel less compulsory 
(and, consequently, what the corporation would be willing to pay 
to avoid action by the advocacy group would have been less as 
well).201 
In discussing why, in part, there are so few judicial opinions 
on the ATS, the Second Circuit in Kiobel explained that: 
  Such civil lawsuits, alleging heinous crimes condemned by 
customary international law, often involve a variety of issues unique 
to ATS litigation, not least the fact that the events took place abroad 
and in troubled or chaotic circumstances. The resulting complexity 
and uncertainty—combined with the fact that juries hearing ATS 
claims are capable of awarding multibillion-dollar verdicts—has led 
many defendants to settle ATS claims prior to trial.202 
Simply recognizing the legitimacy of ATS corporate 
defendant litigation changes the power dynamic between the 
parties. 
 
 200 Id. at 2314–15 (discussing the complexity of motivations in ATS lawsuits 
especially once the plaintiffs’ bar started joining in with more materialistic goals than 
some of the reform-minded advocates). 
 201 As Van Schaack explains: 
  Even short of a full settlement, the commencement of litigation may make 
possible discussions between parties that were foreclosed by power inequalities 
in place prior to the filing of suit. Indeed, the very filing of the suit can provide 
a “foot in the door” to communicate with a defendant corporation that may 
have otherwise dismissed the demands of victims and activists. 
Van Schaack, supra note 146, at 2330. 
 202  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 116 (2010) (citations omitted). 
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Leverage is very powerful.203 As G. Richard Shell explains, 
“[l]everage is your power not just to reach agreement, but to 
obtain an agreement on your own terms.”204 Indeed, it changes 
the stakes.205 “Research has shown that, with leverage, even an 
average negotiator will do pretty well while without leverage 
only highly skilled bargainers achieve their goals. The party with 
leverage is confident; the party without it is usually nervous and 
uncertain.”206 
A special report in The Economist studied the ATS evolution 
and concluded that the merits of the cases were almost a side 
issue, with the remedy-seeking settlement and leverage 
dynamics at the center of the stage: 
  Most of the rhetoric on CSR may be about doing the right thing 
and trumping competitors, but much of the reality is plain risk 
management. It involves limiting the damage to the brand and the 
bottom line that can be inflicted by a bad press and consumer 
boycotts, as well as dealing with the threat of legal action. In America, 
the legal instrument of choice . . . is the Alien Tort Claims Act . . . . 
Even if it does not get as far as a trial, this can be embarrassing and 
costly for companies.207 
Williams similarly opined that the merits of these corporate 
ATS cases were not nearly as important as the power brought by 
the mere legal legitimacy of the lawsuits—“they represent a form 
of leverage and a forum for leverage being newly brought to bear 
on global corporate social responsibility issues.”208 Most ATS 
suits against corporations were weak on the merits and instead 
were useful as a mechanism to get corporations to settle, beating 
the corporations down with the prospect of protracted and 
expensive litigation, and ultimately obtain something valuable 
 
 203 SHELL, supra note 141, at 103 (“Threat leverage gets people’s attention because, 
as astute negotiators have known for centuries and psychologists have repeatedly proven, 
potential losses loom larger in the human mind than do equivalent gains.”). 
 204 Id. at 90. 
 205 Id. at 98 (“To gain real leverage, you must eventually persuade the other party 
that he or she has something concrete to lose in the transaction if the deal falls through.”).  
 206 Id. at 90. 
 207 A Special Report on Corporate Social Responsibility: A Stitch in Time, ECONOMIST, 
January 19, 2008, at 12; see also Dudley, supra note 188, at G12. In his reporting, Dudley 
observed that “corporate watchdog groups say the lawsuits have helped usher in a new 
era of corporate social responsibility . . . .” Id. He continued to report the statement from 
Pam Muckosy, the research manager for the London-based Ethical Corporation Institute, 
that “‘Sometimes companies pursue CSR in order to improve their international 
reputation and be a good “global citizen,” . . . Other times, it’s about securing a local 
“license to operate.” Increasingly, it seems to be about minimizing legal risks.’” Id. 
 208 Williams, supra note 1, at 772; see also Childress, supra note 138, at 725–26 
(2012) (“[I]t is arguable that modern uses of the ATS against corporations” result in part 
because of the “signaling value that is offered when bringing suit against a corporation for 
alleged violations of international law” and “brand damage while gaining significant 
publicity in hopes of both encouraging policy change and a monetary settlement.”). 
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for the plaintiff advocates (i.e., a share of some of their profits 
either directly or through forcing corporate expenditures on 
projects of value to the plaintiff corporate social responsibility 
group).209 Despite these often weak claims, the gains from 
settlement for the plaintiffs and the corporate social 
responsibility causes they championed were often substantial—
either in dollar terms210 or in costly alterations in behavior 
agreed to by a corporation to settle a case.211 
The lawsuit-as-settlement-leverage litigation model was 
clearly utilized in the ATS corporate defendant suits. Douglas 
Branson, for example, has claimed that “[t]he ultimate value of 
ATS lawsuits, or some of them, is not to hold the multinational 
parent liable, or to force the multinational to undergo a long and 
complicated trial. The ultimate objective should be to send a 
message to corporate boardrooms and to obtain a recovery for 
persons who have suffered very real harms.”212 That messaging 
process, according to Branson, meant these ATS suits could be 
used to scare corporations into settlements or otherwise into 
making decisions that accomplish changes in behavior consistent 
with meeting the demands of the corporate social 
responsibility-oriented interest groups represented by the 
plaintiffs in these cases.213 As explained in my earlier work: 
 
 209 Gary C. Hufbauer, Why Shouldn’t Corporations Be Liable Under the ATS?, 43 
GEO. J. INT’L L. 1009, 1010 (2012) (“Many ATS suits are class actions that entail years of 
litigation, extensive discovery of corporate records, and damage to the corporation’s 
reputation. Such suits are mostly an effort by the plaintiffs to force a corporate settlement 
regardless of the underlying merits.”); David Scheffer & Caroline Kaeb, The Five Levels of 
CSR Compliance: The Resiliency of Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute and 
the Case for a Counterattack Strategy in Compliance Theory, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 334, 
372 (2011) (“Corporations remain exposed to the risks of diminished reputation and to the 
costs of legal settlements that offer attractive alternatives to prolonged litigation under 
the ATS, depending on its current fate before the federal courts.”). 
 210 See Dunst, supra note 182, at S6 (discussing the fifteen million dollar settlement 
by Shell in one case and concluding that “the Shell settlement certainly may incentivize 
plaintiffs to file additional claims under the act in the future”); Unocal Settles Rights 
Suits in Myanmar, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2004, at C6; Catherine Rampell, Yahoo Settles 
With Chinese Families, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 2007, at D4; see also Jonathan Drimmer, 
Resurrection Ecology and the Evolution of the Corporate Alien Tort Movement, 43 GEO. J. 
INT’L L. 989, 998 (2012) (“While for years federal courts routinely dismissed corporate 
ATS cases, plaintiffs have gained a greater frequency of settlements and victories,” and 
“[s]everal corporate ATS cases have settled for well over ten million dollars.”); Van 
Schaack, supra note 146, at 2239 (discussing a variety of settlements induced by ATS 
suits). 
 211 Jeffrey A. Van Detta, Politics and Legal Regulation in the International Business 
Environment: An FDI Case Study of Alstom, S.A., in Israel, 21 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1, 77 
(2013) (“the objective of . . . more than a few ATS suits filed against MNEs is to reset the 
context and terms of activism in opposition to” corporate behaviors). 
 212 Douglas M. Branson, Holding Multinational Corporations Accountable? Achilles’ 
Heels in Alien Tort Claims Act Litigation, 9 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 227, 249 (2011). 
 213 Id. 
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  The currency by which a corporation may satisfy the pressure 
imposed against it could involve alterations in behavior, expenditures 
on public relations campaigns, or contributions to funds or charities of 
allegedly affected groups. It could take the form of outright monetary 
payments, ceasing or altering operations to comply with demands or 
private codes or protocols, enacting codes of conduct, joining compacts, 
establishing corporate social responsibility departments, instituting 
training, committing to transparency initiatives like contracting for 
external audits, and other mechanisms that either alter behavior or 
otherwise satisfy those interests applying some form of pressure to the 
corporate operation.214 
Those investing in ATS liability had succeeded in developing 
a legal liability regime that frightened corporations.215 
The threat of liability gave the corporate social responsibility 
promoters of ATS liability an advantage, particularly for 
pressuring corporations to settle to make an ATS suit go away or 
take actions favorable to the advocacy group to avoid the filing of 
a lawsuit in the first place.216 The mere acceptance of this 
liability doctrine and its extension to cover corporate behavior 
and snag corporations as defendants were alone enough to 
immediately shift the balance in any negotiations between the 
advocacy groups and corporations.217 Settling is sometimes just 
about hedging risk, similar to a corporation’s financial decision to 
buy insurance.218 The legal status of, and the weapons available 
to, the corporate social responsibility activists were strengthened 
while concomitantly the legal positions of the corporations were 
weakened. When the law changes, so does the risk calculus,219 
 
 214 Kochan, Mechanization, supra note 27, at 256. 
 215 Childress, supra note 138, at 725 (plaintiffs can “create public-relations problems 
for corporations, and thus force a settlement, because no corporation wishes to be known 
as a human-rights abuser or violator of international law”); see also SHELL, supra note 
141, at 101 (“A better way to understand leverage is to think about which side, at any 
given moment, has the most to lose from a failure to agree.”); Adler & Silverstein, supra 
note 87, at 20 (“[T]he essence of determining the relative power of the parties in a 
negotiation depends less on how powerful each party is in any absolute sense than on how 
badly each party needs or fears the other.”).  
 216 SHELL, supra note 141, at 104 (“Leverage is a complex mixture of ideas,” including 
“opportunities that will be lost if the parties fail to reach a deal, threats to each party’s 
status quo, and possible losses to each side’s self-esteem should their actions appear 
inconsistent (in their own eyes) with a prior or professed standard of conduct or dealing.”). 
 217 See generally Dellinger, supra note 171 (describing strategies to stay out of court 
under ATS by enacting preemptive corporate social responsibility measures). 
 218 J.B. Heaton, Settlement Pressure, 25 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 264, 272 (2005) 
(“Corporations routinely buy insurance, and engage in a variety of more and less 
sophisticated hedging activities.”). 
 219 Scheffer & Kaeb, supra note 209, at 372 (“The ATS presents a formidable 
challenge in risk assessments because the liability that arises under ATS litigation, 
whether or not the plaintiffs are successful, can be significant financially and otherwise.”). 
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and so then does one’s willingness to give in to another party now 
in a superior position. 
Expansionist corporate social responsibility advocates clothe 
their cause in a sense of pure motives and objectives, allowing 
them to sell their cause to the sympathies of the public. It made 
it difficult to run an opposition campaign with these optics. Thus, 
corporations faced with ATS suits or the threat of such suits 
sought to mute the campaign against them associated with an 
ATS suit by negotiating away the case or possible filing of a 
complaint. Preventative intervention is essential because some 
damage could be done even just by filing an ATS suit.220 
Risk-averse corporations showed a willingness to settle or 
change behavior to avoid even the possibility of an ATS suit. 
Negotiated agreements before suits were filed, settlements, and 
other defensive tactics were designed to prevent, or at least 
minimize, potential reputational and other damage to the 
corporation.221 Corporations were motivated out of the fear of the 
ATS and the changed position created by the alteration in legal 
status accomplished by the creation of the ATS doctrine. When 
the stakes are high for a defendant, settlement is often a 
reasonable choice.222 
The “unknowns” regarding how the courts would treat novel 
theories of liability against corporations created risks that 
further made settlement a reasonable option for defendants in 
the early years of the developing doctrine holding corporations 
liable under the ATS.223 Uncertainty itself motivates settlement. 
The Supreme Court has recognized in a different but relatable 
context that, when there is “uncertainty of the governing rules, 
entities subject to secondary liability as aiders and abettors may 
find it prudent and necessary, as a business judgment, to 
abandon substantial defenses and to pay settlements in order to 
avoid the expense and risk of going to trial.”224 The risks of 
substantial litigation costs and the potential for long trials with 
 
 220 Dellinger, supra note 171, at 59 (“Even though cases regarding human rights 
violations often result in settlement or dismissal, the tarnish to a corporation’s reputation 
remains.”). 
 221 Id. at 74–75 (mere ever-present threat of ATS suits encourages companies to 
change behavior to avoid litigation). 
 222 Posner, supra note 142, at 418–19 (explaining situations where the stakes impact 
decisions to settle). 
 223 See generally id.; see also John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 279, 280–81, 296 (1973) (examining “how individuals engaged in civil suits 
will behave” and finding that “a critical component in the motivation of such individuals 
to settle out of court is agreement on the probabilities of the court’s action”). 
 224 Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 189 
(1994). 
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extended discovery and lawyers’ fees made settlement attractive 
for ATS defendants.225 
Here again, discovery alone is a high risk for the corporation 
and a huge gain for the plaintiffs. For example, in discovery there 
is an ability to uncover information that, whether it establishes 
liability or not, may not paint a very pretty picture of corporate 
operations or at least the conditions in the areas where they 
operate in developing countries.226 Guilt by operation in certain 
regimes—a type of guilt by association—could be implied in the 
eyes of the public that hears about an ATS suit against a 
corporation and the atrocious allegations in the daily news for too 
long. The literature on corporate behavior reveals that 
corporations will go to great lengths to avoid damage to their 
brand and reputation.227 Therefore, the potential damaging 
impacts on a corporation’s reputation and brand from a lawsuit, 
trial publicity, and plaintiffs’ promotion of their case in the press 
often mitigates in favor of settling.228 Avoiding these damages to 
reputation and brand may often be more valuable to a 
corporation than avoidance of a large monetary judgment, 
explaining why a corporation might settle even those cases that 
it believes it can win on the merits.229 When a corporation faces 
opposing forces that are threatening the corporate image or 
reputation, it is not surprising that the corporation will be 
reactive and work to quell the impact of the reputation-damaging 
 
 225 Posner, supra note 142, at 417 (“[S]ettlement costs are normally much lower than 
litigation costs . . . .”). 
 226 Van Detta, supra note 211, at 76 (discussing “the considerable transactional costs 
attendant to American-style discovery and civil practice, the generation of negative public 
opinion and negative opinion among investors and analysts, and the costs of settlement—
which corporate ATS defendants have incurred in more than a few cases”).  
 227 Fairfax, supra note 140, at 805–06 (discussing the literature on the importance of 
brand and reputation protection to corporations). 
 228 Kevin T. Jackson, Global Corporate Governance: Soft Law and Reputational 
Accountability, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 41, 47 (2010) (“[U]nlike traditional hard law 
enforcement regimes, today’s emerging ‘civil regulations’ are grounded in the ‘rule of 
reputation,’ which ties accountability solely to reputational capital, or lack thereof.  
Operating internationally and faced with pressure to self-regulate, a company’s 
reputation has become one of its most valuable assets.”); Stephens, supra note 132, at 14 
(“Even absent payment of a judgment, the defendant may be ‘punished’ by public 
exposure . . . .”); see also Peter T. Hoffman, Valuation of Cases for Settlement: Theory and 
Practice, 1991 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 35 (1991) (“Settlement also can avoid the unwanted 
publicity of a trial, a matter particularly important” when there are reputations to 
maintain.); Jonathan C. Drimmer & Sarah R. Lamoree, Think Globally, Sue Locally: 
Trends and Out-of-Court Tactics in Transnational Tort Actions, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 
456, 489–622 (2011) (using multiple case studies to show the effectiveness of out-of-court 
tactics coordinated with and accompanying transnational tort litigation). 
 229 Scheffer & Kaeb, supra note 209, at 373 (“[R]eputational risks . . . can do far more 
to damage corporate profitability and the long-term credibility of the ‘brand name’ than 
most court cases could impose upon a corporate defendant.”). 
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possibilities like the initiation of an ATS suit, let alone its filing 
and progression to trial.230 
When defendants are placed in untenable litigation positions 
and the cost of defending against class actions is especially high, 
for example, some have gone so far as to characterize the 
plaintiff’s position to demand settlement as metaphorically akin 
to a blackmailer.231 Moreover, the mere ability to threaten a class 
action suit has been described by some scholars as creating a 
situation of “legalized blackmail.”232 Whether class actions or not, 
ATS suits create the same power dynamic as described in that 
analysis. 
In fact, Judge Dennis Jacobs from the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit, when concurring in the denial of 
rehearing in the Kiobel case that had held corporations could not 
be liable under the ATS, explained that the holding halting 
corporate ATS suits had the “considerable benefit of avoiding 
abuse of the courts to extort settlements.”233 He discussed the 
ATS corporate lawsuit as riddled with opportunities for 
coercively induced settlements by corporations: 
  The holding of this case matters nevertheless because, without it, 
plaintiffs would be able to plead . . . in a way that . . . would delay 
dismissal of ATS suits against corporations; and the invasive 
discovery that ensues could coerce settlements that have no relation to 
the prospect of success on the ultimate merits. American discovery in 
such cases uncovers corporate strategy and planning, diverts 
resources and executive time, provokes bad public relations or 
boycotts, threatens exposure of dubious trade practices, and risks 
trade secrets. . . . These coercive pressures, combined with pressure to 
remove contingent reserves from the corporate balance sheet, can 
 
 230 Fairfax, supra note 140, at 806–07; Priest & Klein, supra note 143, at 24; Mulreed, 
supra note 143, at 781 n.2. 
 231 See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298–1300 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(Posner, J.) (citing HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 120 
(1973) (citing Handler while discussing the dynamics in class action cases and the high 
likelihood that they “produce blackmail settlements”)); Milton Handler, The Shift from 
Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits—The Twenty-Third Annual 
Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1971) (“Any device which is workable only 
because it utilizes the threat of unmanageable and expensive litigation to compel 
settlement is not a rule of procedure—it is a form of legalized blackmail.”). See also 
Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1357, 1386 (2003) (“It seems safe to conclude that proponents are using the word 
‘blackmail’ metaphorically.”). 
 232 See, e.g., In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Products Liability 
Litigation, 55 F.3d 768, 784–85 (3d Cir. 1995) (“Another problem is that class actions 
create the opportunity for a kind of legalized blackmail: a greedy and unscrupulous 
plaintiff might use the threat of a large class action, which can be costly to the defendant, 
to extract a settlement far in excess of the individual claims’ actual worth.”).  
 233 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 642 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2011) (Jacobs, 
C.J., concurring in denial of rehearing). 
Do Not Delete 3/18/2014 8:16 PM 
470 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 17:2 
easily coerce the payment of tens of millions of dollars in settlement, 
even where a plaintiff’s likelihood of success on the merits is zero. 
Courts should take care that they do not become instruments of abuse 
and extortion.234 
This extortion-like threat was facilitated by an all-out strategy to 
use both the in-court threat of ATS liability and out-of-court 
tactics touting the claimed ATS liability as a means to pressure 
corporations.235 
Indeed, what is particularly important with the evolution of 
the ATS cases against corporations is the power that came from 
the mere recognition by the courts of the legitimacy of these 
lawsuits.236 Once courts started denying motions to dismiss 
against corporate ATS defendants, the settlement dynamic 
changed dramatically. Research shows that plaintiffs’ ability to 
survive a motion to dismiss substantially alters corporations’ and 
other defendants’ risk assessments regarding non-settlement 
options (such as going to trial).237 The chance of settlement is 
much higher when plaintiff’s case can withstand a motion to 
dismiss because it is usually the cheaper and less risky 
alternative.238 It is for this reason that the development of the 
liability regime under the ATS—including the cases that 
ultimately used early ATS case precedent to build toward the 
creation of the corporate liability layer of ATS doctrine—became 
so important and such a powerful rent-seeking achievement. 
For a long time, the threat of ATS liability had a substantial 
impact on leverage. The power dynamic between corporations 
and corporate social responsibility advocates substantially 
changed as a result of the liability regime that was emerging and 
threatening to emerge. As all of these corporate ATS lawsuits 
began to pick up steam, debate grew regarding the 
appropriateness of using U.S. courts to extraterritorially enforce 
 
 234  Id. 
 235 Drimmer, supra note 210, at 999 (“[O]ut-of-court tactics, in conjunction with 
litigation, have taken hold. Plaintiffs, their attorneys, and their representatives regularly 
utilize these strategies to pressure corporate defendants to settle cases or change existing 
practices, publicize their causes, and for other purposes” (emphasis added)); Drimmer & 
Lamoree, supra note 228, at 472–88 (explaining how in connection with ATS and other 
“transnational tort cases, parties frequently employ [a variety of] out-of-court tactics in 
part to publicly advance their cause, pressure their opponents, or initiate corporate 
change” including media, investment, political, and community organizing tactics).  
 236 See generally Adler & Silverstein, supra note 87, at 6 (exploring “the concept of 
power disparities in negotiation”).   
 237 Sale, supra note 144, at 386 (2011) (showing the relationship between 
survivability of motions to dismiss and defendants motivations to settle to avoid damages 
and reputational harm). 
 238 Id.; see also Pritchard, supra note 145, at 952–53 (1999) (stating that if plaintiffs 
can survive a motion to dismiss, defendants will often settle to minimize further harm).  
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supposed internationally accepted norms and impose liability for 
violations of such norms by foreign actors and for actions outside 
the United States that were otherwise subject to foreign laws and 
regulations. 
The Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. case reached the 
U.S. Supreme Court after the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit held that corporations were not proper defendants 
under the ATS.239 The Second Circuit’s decision split with several 
other circuits that had decided ATS suits against corporations 
could proceed.240 Although not deciding when, if ever, 
corporations are proper defendants under the ATS, the 2013 
Supreme Court decision in Kiobel severely limited ATS suits, 
including those against corporations, by interpreting the ATS as 
having no (or some say almost no) extraterritorial reach.241 
Because almost all of the available corporate social responsibility 
stories for ATS cases involved corporate actions outside the 
United States, the ATS as a corporate social responsibility tool 
against anyone, including multi-national corporations, was 
effectively neutralized by Kiobel.242 
If there was any doubt about the ATS as a rent-seeking 
interest group strategy, one need only look at the press releases 
immediately following Kiobel by many of the activist groups 
lamenting that the Court “shut their doors” to their causes and 
the fact that the Court “harshly limited” usage of the ATS.243 The 
 
 239 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 621 F.3d 111, 147–48 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding 
that corporations are not subjects of international law and therefore law of nations does 
not recognize corporate liability). 
 240 See, e.g., Doe v. Exxon Mobile Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated by 
Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 09-7125, 2013 WL 3970103 (D.C. Cir. July 26, 2013); Flomo 
v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1025 (7th Cir. 2011); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 
PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 818 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. granted and judgment vacated by 
Rio Tinto PLC v. Sarei, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013); Romero v. Drummond Co., Inc., 552 F.3d 
1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 241 See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (“We therefore conclude that the presumption 
against extraterritoriality applies to claims under the ATS, and that nothing in the 
statute rebuts that presumption.”). See also, e.g., Michael D. Goldhaber, The Global 
Lawyer: The Zombification of the Corporate Alien Tort, THE LITIGATION DAILY, Apr. 21, 
2013, http://www.americanlawyer.com/digestTAL.jsp?id=1202596949949 (“Rather than 
kill the corporate alien tort outright, the Court maimed all forms of alien tort by 
restricting their territorial reach. The corporate alien tort is therefore doomed to remain a 
zombie doctrine—not quite alive and not quite dead.”).  
 242 Rich Samp, Supreme Court Observations: Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum & the 
Future of Alien Tort Litigation, FORBES, Apr. 18, 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
wlf/2013/04/18/supreme-court-observations-kiobel-v-royal-dutch-petroleum-the-future-of-
alien-tort-litigation/ (“Yesterday’s decision . . . will lead to the dismissal of virtually all 
pending ATS cases.”).  
 243 See, e.g., Kiobel v. Shell: Supreme Court Limits Courts’ Ability to Hear Claims of 
Human Rights Abuses Committed Abroad, CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (Apr. 17, 
2013), http://ccrjustice.org/newsroom/press-releases/kiobel-v.-shell%3A-supreme-court-lim 
its-courts%E2%80%99-ability-hear-claims-of-human-rights-abuses-committed-a (quoting 
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complaints in the press releases sounded like investors who had 
seen their portfolio (represented by the package of ATS 
precedents purchased) disappear, holding stocks they could not 
sell (represented by the fact that the courts were now closed to 
almost all claims where those precedents could have been 
valuable), suffering from a metaphorical stock market crash 
(represented by the devaluation of those precedents as a 
consequence of the Kiobel holding). These groups tried to find a 
silver lining in the decision and held out hope for some suits 
against corporations surviving,244 but realistically there is very 
little room left in the now-limited ATS for its use as a corporate 
social responsibility tool. Some groups admitted that they would 
need to redirect their investments now that the ATS remedy was 
cut off. For example, one corporate social responsibility group 
named the Accountability Counsel informed its members in a 
post-Kiobel press release that “[f]or victims of corporate abuse 
 
lead counsel for the Kiobel plaintiffs (who has also been counsel in many ATS cases) as 
stating, “We are disappointed by today’s ruling and the fact that U.S. courts have shut 
their doors to the human rights violations our clients suffered”); Natalie B. Fields, What 
Kiobel Means for Corporate Accountability, ACCOUNTABILITY COUNSEL (Apr. 17, 2013), 
http://www.accountabilitycounsel.org/news/what-kiobel-means-to-corporate-accountab 
ility/ (“Today, the U.S. Supreme Court harshly limited cases that may be brought in U.S. 
courts against corporations that commit human rights abuses abroad.”); Kiobel Ruling 
Undermines U.S. Leadership on Human Rights, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST (Apr. 17, 2013), 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/2013/04/17/kiobel-ruling-undermines-u-s-leadership-on-
human-rights/ (“Today in its decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, the Supreme 
Court gutted the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), a law that has been on the books for more than 
200 years and for the last 30 years has been a critical avenue to hold serious human 
rights violators accountable.”); Kate Mitchell, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum and the 
Future of Corporate Accountability for Human Rights Violations Committed Abroad, 
OXFORD HUMAN RIGHTS HUB (Apr. 21, 2013), http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/?p=1579  (“The 
Court held that the Alien Torts Statute (ATS) did not apply extraterritorially, shutting off 
an avenue previously embraced by human rights advocates for making corporations 
accountable for human rights abuses committed abroad.”); Civil and Human Rights 
Coalition Criticizes Supreme Court Ruling in Kiobel as a Setback for Human Rights, THE 
LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (Apr. 17, 2013), http://www.civilrights.org/press/2013/kiobel-
supreme-court.html (“Today’s decision in Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum undermines the 
unique and important role of U.S. courts in providing an opportunity for justice for those 
who have suffered serious human rights violations at the hands of repressive regimes 
around the world. With this decision, the Supreme Court has closed our courthouse doors 
 . . . .”). 
 244 See, e.g., Alison Frankel, Human Rights Lawyers Look for Silver Lining in Kiobel 
Black Cloud, REUTERS BLOG (Apr. 17, 2013, 10:09 PM), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-
frankel/2013/04/17/human-rights-lawyers-look-for-silver-lining-in-kiobel-black-cloud/ 
(“When the U.S. Chamber of Commerce rushes out a statement hailing a decision by the 
U.S. Supreme Court, you can be sure that opinion is a defeat for plaintiffs’ lawyers.”); 
Wessen Jazrawi, Kiobel v Shell: US Supreme Court on corporate accountability for foreign 
human rights abuses, UK HUMAN RIGHTS BLOG (Apr. 18, 2013), 
http://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2013/04/18/kiobel-v-shell-us-supreme-court-on-corporate-
accountability-for-foreign-human-rights-abuses/ (“[W]hilst Kiobel has been a setback for 
those seeking stronger accountability of multinationals operating abroad, the decision 
does not mean that corporations are immune from liability, and ways will continue to be 
sought to that end.”). 
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that had hoped to use U.S. courts, and now cannot, our work [on 
non-judicial accountability mechanisms] just became that much 
more important.”245 Several of these groups in their statements 
specifically discussed Kiobel as a blow to corporate accountability 
and social responsibility campaigns.246 A critical weapon in the 
expansionist corporate social responsibility activists’ arsenal was 
lost.247 Of course, all sides had an opinion.248 Immediately 
following the decision, business-aligned interest groups also had 
their own press releases applauding the Kiobel decision in large 
part due to the relief it provided for the corporation’s legal 
positioning.249 
 
 245 Fields, supra note 243. 
 246 See, e.g., Marjorie Jobson, South Africa: Unanswered Questions For The South 
Africa Apartheid Litigation As U.S. Supreme Court April 17 Rules Against The Kiobel 




m_medium=email (“The Kiobel decision seems to have ‘cut a hole into the web of 
accountability . . . .,’ said Elisa Massimino, President of Human Rights First.”); US: 
Supreme Court Limits Suits Against Rights Abusers Abroad, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Apr. 
29, 2013), http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/29/us-supreme-court-limits-suits-against-
rights-abusers-abroad (“[Kiobel] undercuts case law that had made the US courts a 
mainstay for redress for victims of serious human rights abuses.”); Analysis: Set-Back for 
Corporate Accountability on Human Rights, THE DANISH INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 
(Apr. 23, 2013), http://humanrights.dk/news/news?doc=22277 (“Last week, events in the 
US made it harder to hold multinational companies accountable for contributing to 
human rights abuses in their global operations . . . . For the past two decades, the ATS 
has been one of the most visible manifestations of the global need for greater clarity on 
the human rights responsibility of corporate actors.”). 
 247 Jobson, supra note 246. Jobson concludes that “this power to advance corporate 
accountability has been significantly reduced by the US Supreme Court’s decision.” Id.  
She quotes Rita Kesselring, a Swiss scholar who wrote that, “[i]n an environment in 
which few institutions, whether judicial or political, have been able to secure the 
accountability and liability of corporations, the ATS has served a unique and critical 
function. It has had the power to enforce liability for compromising the dignity of human 
beings and (it) has strengthened international human rights against corporate abuse.”  
Id.   
 248 Marcia Coyle, Justice Limit Reach of Alien Tort Law, AM. LAWYER, Apr. 17, 2013, 
available at http://www.americanlawyer.com/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202596443758& 
Justices_Limit_Reach_of_Alien_Tort_Law (describing the reactions from both sides to the 
Kiobel decision). 
 249 See, e.g., U.S. Chamber Commends Supreme Court for Reining In Abuses of Alien 
Tort Statute, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (Apr. 17, 2013), http://www.uschamber.com/ 
press/releases/2013/april/us-chamber-commends-supreme-court-reining-abuses-alien-tort-
statute (“U.S. Chamber of Commerce today praised [the Kiobel] decision . . . that limits 
the global business community’s liability under the [ATS]” calling the ATS cases “a 
scheme by class action trial lawyers” to “expose global businesses to frivolous and costly 
lawsuits”); Peter Nestor, The Supreme Court Has Ruled on Kiobel. Now What?, THE 
BUSINESS OF A BETTER WORLD (Apr. 17, 2013), http://www.bsr.org/en/our-insights/blog-
view/the-supreme-court-has-ruled-on-kiobel.-now-what (“Our initial assessment after 
today’s opinion is that most businesses will not likely face suit in U.S. federal court under 
this ruling, particularly for allegations of abuse occurring abroad.”). 
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As a result of Kiobel and the closing of the ATS 
mechanization to achieve corporate social responsibility 
objectives, we should see the expansionist interest groups 
channel their resources to other avenues. There should be a 
post-Kiobel shift in their investment strategy, perhaps away from 
law creation or just to other law-production centers. We have 
seen this shift in part with the rise of state-based tort claims 
seeking remedies for supposed corporate harms and state-based 
causes of action with extra-territorial reach, including and 
sometimes beyond what these groups attempted to push through 
the mechanism of the ATS.250 It would be interesting in future 
work to research where these corporate social responsibility 
groups divert the funds previously dedicated to their ATS 
litigation budgets. 
Despite the convincing proof of its demise through Kiobel, 
the story of the ATS’s life tells an interesting tale about interest 
group behavior and corporate social responsibility activism. The 
ATS evolution is instructive about the means and institutional 
venues for rent-seeking behavior and the real possible returns 
from investing in the creation of law (including liability 
doctrines) beneficial to one’s self-interest. 
CONCLUSION 
Public choice, interest group theory, and the economic 
analysis of law provide methods by which we can better 
understand the operational aspects of corporate social 
responsibility advocacy. Like any interest groups, those groups 
labeling as their mission the advancement of new social 
responsibilities for corporations will engage in the same 
cost/benefit analysis as any other interest groups determining 
where to invest their limited time, money, and other resources. 
When rent-seeking for legal change is the more efficient use of 
their limited resources, corporate social responsibility groups will 
invest in the creation of law to advance their own interests at the 
expense of others. This Article sought to explain these 
motivations and position corporate social responsibility activism 
in the same category of skepticism due any interest-group 
investment in the creation of laws. 
 
 250 See generally Childress III, supra note 138; Ziad Haider, Corporate Liability for 
Human Rights Abuses: Analyzing Kiobel and Alternatives to the Alien Tort Statute, 43 
GEO. J. INT’L L. 1361 (2012); Roger Alford, Kiobel Insta-Symposium: The Death of the ATS 
and the Rise of Transnational Tort Litigation, OPINIO JURIS (Apr. 17, 2013, 5:48 PM), 
http://opiniojuris.org/2013/04/17/kiobel-instthe-death-of-the-ats-and-the-rise-of-transnatio 
nal-tort-litigation/. 
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Finally, both generally and through the case study of the 
ATS, this Article sought to demonstrate that rent-seeking 
analysis should have broad application. There is room for 
increased scrutiny of new rules of liability emerging from the 
courts that, in all likelihood, have sometimes themselves been 
the product of interest group investment in the creation of new 
judicial doctrine. There are lessons to be learned about 
precedent-building litigation development strategies employed in 
public law litigation and elsewhere. Moreover, these insights 
help expand the utility of public choice analysis, and more 
aggressive use of this mode of analyzing litigation outcomes for 
rent-seeking origins could provide further valuable insights on 
how tort laws and other judicially-created legal doctrines come 
about and whether their content should receive more critical 
examination as a result of the background processes of their 
creation. 
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